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Modelos Microeconômicos de Corrupção Burocrática e Seus Determinantes Econômicos

  • André Carraro

    (UNISC-RS)

  • Ronald O. Hillbrecht

    (UFRGS)

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    No abstract is available for this item.

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    File URL: http://www.anpec.org.br/encontro2003/artigos/D36.pdf
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    Paper provided by ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pósgraduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics] in its series Anais do XXXI Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 31th Brazilian Economics Meeting] with number d36.

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    Date of creation: 2003
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    Handle: RePEc:anp:en2003:d36
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    1. Bac, Mehmet, 1996. "Corruption and Supervision Costs in Hierarchies," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 99-118, April.
    2. Barreto, Raul A., 2000. "Endogenous corruption in a neoclassical growth model," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 35-60, January.
    3. Thierry Verdier & Daron Acemoglu, 2000. "The Choice between Market Failures and Corruption," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 194-211, March.
    4. Eskeland, Gunnar S. & Thiele, Henrik, 1999. "Corruption under moral hazard," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2204, The World Bank.
    5. Menezes, Flavio Marques, 2000. "The Microeconomics of Corruption: The Classical Approach," Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 405, FGV/EPGE Escola Brasileira de Economia e Finanças, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil).
    6. Acemoglu, Daron & Verdier, Thierry, 1998. "Property Rights, Corruption and the Allocation of Talent: A General Equilibrium Approach," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 108(450), pages 1381-1403, September.
    7. Sheetal K. Chand & Karl Ove Moene, 1997. "Controlling Fiscal Corruption," IMF Working Papers 97/100, International Monetary Fund.
    8. Ades, Alberto & Di Tella, Rafael, 1997. "National Champions and Corruption: Some Unpleasant Interventionist Arithmetic," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 107(443), pages 1023-42, July.
    9. Fender, John, 1999. "A general equilibrium model of crime and punishment," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 39(4), pages 437-453, July.
    10. Pranab Bardhan, 1997. "Corruption and Development: A Review of Issues," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 35(3), pages 1320-1346, September.
    11. Murphy, Kevin M & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1993. "Why Is Rent-Seeking So Costly to Growth?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(2), pages 409-14, May.
    12. Chang, Juin-jen & Lai, Ching-chong & Yang, C. C., 2000. "Casual police corruption and the economics of crime:: Further results," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 35-51, March.
    13. Treisman, Daniel, 2000. "The causes of corruption: a cross-national study," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(3), pages 399-457, June.
    14. International Monetary Fund, 1997. "Corruption and the Rate of Temptation; Do Low Wages in the Civil Service Cause Corruption?," IMF Working Papers 97/73, International Monetary Fund.
    15. Era Dabla-Norris, 2000. "A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Corruption in Bureaucracies," IMF Working Papers 00/106, International Monetary Fund.
    16. Al-Marhubi, Fahim A., 2000. "Corruption and inflation," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 199-202, February.
    17. Steven N. S. Cheung, 1996. "A Simplistic General Equilibrium Theory Of Corruption," Contemporary Economic Policy, Western Economic Association International, vol. 14(3), pages 1-5, 07.
    18. Mauro, Paolo, 1995. "Corruption and Growth," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 110(3), pages 681-712, August.
    19. Silva, Marcos Fernandes da, 1999. "The political economy of corruption in Brazil," RAE - Revista de Administração de Empresas, FGV-EAESP Escola de Administração de Empresas de São Paulo (Brazil), vol. 39(3), January.
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