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¿Por qué la gente floja gana más dinero? El extraño caso de la prima salarial del sector público

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  • Ugo Panizza

Abstract

(Disponible en idioma inglés únicamente) Investigaciones empíricas sugieren la presencia de una prima salarial en el sector público, cuyos motivos se analizan en este trabajo. Los resultados demuestran que las mujeres reciben una prima mayor y que la prima disminuye según lo hace la capacitación. La estabilidad laboral disminuye el incentivo de trabajar con dedicación y obliga al sector público a pagar salarios más elevados. Por lo tanto, se puede emplear la prima salarial del sector público como indicador de la ineficiencia del sector público.

Suggested Citation

  • Ugo Panizza, 1999. "¿Por qué la gente floja gana más dinero? El extraño caso de la prima salarial del sector público," Research Department Publications 4177, Inter-American Development Bank, Research Department.
  • Handle: RePEc:idb:wpaper:4177
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