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Domestic and External Sovereign Debt

Author

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  • Di Casola, Paola

    (Monetary Policy Department, Central Bank of Sweden)

  • Sichlimiris, Spyridon

    (Örebro University)

Abstract

Why do countries tend to repay their domestic and external debt, even though the legal enforcement of the sovereign debt contract is limited? Contrary to conventional wisdom, we argue that temporary market exclusion after default is costly. When the domestic financial market is characterized by a scarcity of private saving instruments, a government can partition its debt market into domestic and external segments, by restricting capital flows, to exploit its market power. The government's market power mitigates the problem of limited commitment, by making default a more costly option. Consequently, it extends the government's external debt capacity. We replicate the domestic and external sovereign debt for non-advanced economies, by unveiling their link to financial repression.

Suggested Citation

  • Di Casola, Paola & Sichlimiris, Spyridon, 2017. "Domestic and External Sovereign Debt," Working Paper Series 345, Sveriges Riksbank (Central Bank of Sweden).
  • Handle: RePEc:hhs:rbnkwp:0345
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Pablo D'Erasmo & Enrique G. Mendoza, 2016. "Distributional Incentives In An Equilibrium Model Of Domestic Sovereign Default," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 14(1), pages 7-44, February.
    2. D’Erasmo, Pablo & Mendoza, Enrique G., 2021. "History remembered: Optimal sovereign default on domestic and external debt," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 117(C), pages 969-989.
    3. Dirk Niepelt, 2016. "Domestic and External Debt and Default," 2016 Meeting Papers 635, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    4. Pablo D'Erasmo & Enrique Mendoza, 2011. "Optimal Domestic (and External) Sovereign Default," PIER Working Paper Archive 16-019, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania, revised 04 Aug 2016.
    5. D’Erasmo, P. & Mendoza, E.G. & Zhang, J., 2016. "What is a Sustainable Public Debt?," Handbook of Macroeconomics, in: J. B. Taylor & Harald Uhlig (ed.), Handbook of Macroeconomics, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 0, pages 2493-2597, Elsevier.
    6. Flavia Corneli, 2018. "Sovereign debt maturity structure and its costs," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 1196, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    7. Marina Azzimonti & Vincenzo Quadrini, 2019. "International Spillovers and Bailouts," Department of Economics Working Papers 19-06, Stony Brook University, Department of Economics.
    8. Marina Azzimonti & Vincenzo Quadrini, 2018. "International Spillovers and ‘Ex-ante’ Efficient Bailouts," NBER Working Papers 25011, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    sovereign debt; sovereign default; financial repression; financial development; capital controls;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E21 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Consumption, Saving, Production, Employment, and Investment - - - Consumption; Saving; Wealth
    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • E60 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - General
    • F34 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Lending and Debt Problems
    • F38 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Financial Policy: Financial Transactions Tax; Capital Controls
    • G15 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - International Financial Markets
    • G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
    • H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt
    • O16 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Financial Markets; Saving and Capital Investment; Corporate Finance and Governance

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