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Understanding the Nature of Cooperation Variability

  • Fosgaard, Toke

    ()

    (Department of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen)

  • Hansen , Lars Gårn

    ()

    (Department of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen)

  • Wengström, Erik

    ()

    (Department of Economics, Lund University)

We investigate framing effects in a large-scale public good experiment. We measure indicators of explanations previously proposed in the literature, which when combined with the large sample, enable us to estimate a structural model of framing effects. The model captures potential causal effects and the behavioral heterogeneity of cooperation variability. We find that framing only has a small effect on the average level of cooperation but a substantial effect on behavioral heterogeneity and we show that this can be explained almost exclusively by a corresponding change in the heterogeneity of beliefs about other subjects’ behavior. Preferences are on the other hand stable between frames.

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Paper provided by Lund University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2013:6.

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Length: 56 pages
Date of creation: 19 Mar 2013
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:lunewp:2013_006
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Department of Economics, School of Economics and Management, Lund University, Box 7082, S-220 07 Lund,Sweden

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Fax: +46 +46 2224613
Web page: http://www.nek.lu.se/en

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  24. Park, Eun-Soo, 2000. "Warm-glow versus cold-prickle: a further experimental study of framing effects on free-riding," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 43(4), pages 405-421, December.
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