Understanding the Nature of Cooperation Variability
We investigate framing effects in a large-scale public good experiment. We measure indicators of explanations previously proposed in the literature, which when combined with the large sample, enable us to estimate a structural model of framing effects. The model captures potential causal effects and the behavioral heterogeneity of cooperation variability. We find that framing only has a small effect on the average level of cooperation but a substantial effect on behavioral heterogeneity and we show that this can be explained almost exclusively by a corresponding change in the heterogeneity of beliefs about other subjects’ behavior. Preferences are on the other hand stable between frames.
|Date of creation:||Mar 2013|
|Date of revision:|
|Contact details of provider:|| Web page: http://www.ifro.ku.dk/english/|
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- Iturbe-Ormaetxe, Iñigo & Ponti, Giovanni & Tomás, Josefa & Ubeda, Luis, 2011.
"Framing effects in public goods: Prospect Theory and experimental evidence,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 439-447, June.
- Iñigo Iturbe Ormaetxe & Giovanni Ponti & Josefa Tomás & Luis Ubeda, 2008. "Framing Effects in Public Goods: Prospect Theory and Experimental Evidence," Working Papers. Serie AD 2008-15, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
- Chou, Eileen & McConnell, Margaret & Nagel, Rosemarie & Plott, Charles R., 2007.
"The control of game form recognition in experiments: Understanding dominant strategy failures in a simple two person “Guessing” game,"
1274, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
- Eileen Chou & Margaret McConnell & Rosemarie Nagel & Charles Plott, 2009. "The control of game form recognition in experiments: understanding dominant strategy failures in a simple two person “guessing” game," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 12(2), pages 159-179, June.
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