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Cooperation, framing, and political attitudes

Author

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  • Fosgaard, Toke R.
  • Hansen, Lars G.
  • Wengström, Erik

Abstract

This paper shows that political attitudes are linked to cooperative behavior in an incentivized experiment with a large sample randomly drawn from the Danish population. However, this relationship depends on the way the experiment is framed. In the standard game in which subjects give to a public good, contributions are not linked to political attitudes. In an economically equivalent version, in which subjects take from a public good, left-wingers cooperate significantly more than subjects to the right of the political spectrum. This difference is to some extent caused by differences in beliefs and cooperation preferences but a substantial part is left unexplained, indicating that left wingers find cooperating under this institution more attractive than right wingers do.

Suggested Citation

  • Fosgaard, Toke R. & Hansen, Lars G. & Wengström, Erik, 2019. "Cooperation, framing, and political attitudes," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 158(C), pages 416-427.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:158:y:2019:i:c:p:416-427
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2018.12.010
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Rudolf Kerschbamer & Daniel Muller, 2017. "Social preferences and political attitudes: An online experiment on a large heterogeneous sample," Working Papers 2017-16, Faculty of Economics and Statistics, University of Innsbruck.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Cooperation; Social dilemma; Political ideology; Experiment; Simulation;

    JEL classification:

    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • C90 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - General
    • D03 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Behavioral Microeconomics: Underlying Principles

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