Strategic markets in property rights without price-takers
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KeywordsCournot oligopoly; competitive fringe; market games; property rights; emissions trading; Kyoto Protocol.;
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- D51 - Microeconomics - - General Equilibrium and Disequilibrium - - - Exchange and Production Economies
- Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy
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