Strategic markets in property rights without price-takers
Cournot-type models of markets in property rights typically feature strategists–acting at a first stage–followed by the move of a non-empty marketclearing competitive fringe. So, which agents can presumably be assigned the price-taking role? When simulating the upcoming medium-sized market for greenhouse gas emissions permits under the Kyoto Protocol, no answer to this question stands out as satisfactory. As an escape, trade is instead construed as a two-stage noncooperative cooperative game in which all agents act on both stages, allowing everyone to be a strategist.
|Date of creation:||05 Apr 2005|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Institutt for økonomi, Universitetet i Bergen, Postboks 7802, 5020 Bergen, Norway|
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