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L'apport de l'économie expérimentale dans l'élaboration des politiques publiques

  • Samuel Ferey

    (BETA - Bureau d'économie théorique et appliquée - CNRS : UMR7522 - Université de Strasbourg - Université Nancy II)

  • Yannick Gabuthy

    (CRESE - Centre de REcherches sur les Stratégies Economiques - Université de Franche-Comté : EA)

  • Nicolas Jacquemet

    ()

    (BETA - Bureau d'économie théorique et appliquée - CNRS : UMR7522 - Université de Strasbourg - Université Nancy II, EEP-PSE - Ecole d'Économie de Paris - Paris School of Economics - Ecole d'Économie de Paris)

La capacité des expériences en laboratoire à inspirer l'élaboration et l'évaluation des politiques publiques a été reconnue très tôt dans l'histoire de son développement (Roth, 1988). Ce n'est que très récemment, pourtant, que cette question a émergé avec force dans les discussions académiques, notamment sous l'impulsion des travaux consacrés au paternalisme libéral. Cette doctrine d'élaboration des politiques publiques s'attache à redéfinir les principes libéraux de choix libres et décentralisés à la lumière des développements de l'économie comportementale - qui identifient les limites cognitives des choix rationnels. Nous proposons une introduction et un survol de ce courant de pensée, ainsi qu'un certain nombre d'exemples des conclusions de politique publique sur lesquelles il débouche. Nous confrontons ces arguments et ces conclusions à ceux d'une seconde branche de la littérature, qui s'efforce de restaurer les conditions d'un choix libre et éclairé à travers le développement d'institutions qui permettent aux individus de dépasser ces limites cognitives ; et/ou d'identifier les sources institutionnelles de ces limites de la rationalité, de manière à en circonscrire les effets. Nous concluons cette présentation par une discussion des complémentarités entre ces deux approches qui, bien que diamétralement opposées, fournissent une grille de lecture des liens qu'entretiennent l'économie comportementale et l'élaboration des politiques publiques.

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Paper provided by HAL in its series PSE - Labex "OSE-Ouvrir la Science Economique" with number halshs-00879205.

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Date of creation: 2013
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Publication status: Published, Revue Française d'Economie, 2013, 28, 2, 155-194
Handle: RePEc:hal:pseose:halshs-00879205
Note: View the original document on HAL open archive server: http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00879205
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