When Governments Promise to Prioritize Public Debt: Do Markets Care?
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- Gulati, Mitu & Panizza, Ugo & Weidemaier, Mark & Willingham, Grace, 2019. "When Governments Promise to Prioritize Public Debt: Do Markets Care?," CEPR Discussion Papers 13673, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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More about this item
KeywordsSovereign Debt; Debt Sustainability; Sovereign Spreads;
- E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
- H62 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Deficit; Surplus
- H63 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Debt; Debt Management; Sovereign Debt
- P16 - Economic Systems - - Capitalist Systems - - - Political Economy of Capitalism
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