The benefits of reducing holdout risk: evidence from the Euro CAC experiment, 2013–2018
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- Mattia Osvaldo Picarelli & Aitor Erce & Xu Jiang, 2018. "The Benefits of Reducing Hold-Out Risk: Evidence from the Euro CAC Experiment, 2013-2018," Working Papers 33, European Stability Mechanism.
- Picarelli, Mattia & Erce, Aitor, 2018. "The Benefits of Reducing Hold-Out Risk: Evidence from the Euro CAC Experiment, 2013-2018," MPRA Paper 89973, University Library of Munich, Germany.
Citations
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Cited by:
- Klaus, Juergen & Selga, Eriks & Klein, Tony, 2019. "Floating Rate Notes and Stakeholder Activities During Zero and Negative Interest Rate Regimes," QBS Working Paper Series 2019/03, Queen's University Belfast, Queen's Business School.
- Chuck Fang & Julian Schumacher & Christoph Trebesch, 2021.
"Restructuring Sovereign Bonds: Holdouts, Haircuts and the Effectiveness of CACs,"
IMF Economic Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Monetary Fund, vol. 69(1), pages 155-196, March.
- Schumacher, Julian & Trebesch, Christoph & Fang, Chuck, 2020. "Restructuring sovereign bonds: holdouts, haircuts and the effectiveness of CACs," Working Paper Series 2366, European Central Bank.
- Fang, Chuck & Schumacher, Julian & Trebesch, Christoph, 2021. "Restructuring sovereign bonds: Holdouts, haircuts and the effectiveness of CACs," Kiel Working Papers 2175, Kiel Institute for the World Economy (IfW Kiel).
- Mitu Gulati & Ugo Panizza & W Mark C Weidemaier & Gracie Willingham, 0.
"When Governments Promise to Prioritize Public Debt: Do Markets Care?,"
Journal of Financial Regulation, Oxford University Press, vol. 6(1), pages 41-74.
- Panizza, Ugo & Gulati, Mitu & Weidemaier, Mark & Willingham, Grace, 2019. "When Governments Promise to Prioritize Public Debt: Do Markets Care?," CEPR Discussion Papers 13673, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Mitu Gulati & Ugo Panizza & W. Mark C. Weidemaier & Gracie Willingham, 2019. "When Governments Promise to Prioritize Public Debt: Do Markets Care?," IHEID Working Papers 07-2019, Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies.
- Nicoletta Layher & Eyden Samunderu, 2020. "The Impact of the Introduction of Uniform European Collective Action Clauses on European Government Bonds as a Regulatory Result of the European Sovereign Debt Crisis," JRFM, MDPI, vol. 14(1), pages 1-32, December.
- Klaus, Jürgen & Selga, Ēriks K., 2021. "How floating rate notes stopped floating: Evidence from the negative interest rate regime," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 75(C).
More about this item
JEL classification:
- F3 - International Economics - - International Finance
- G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
- G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
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