IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/
MyIDEAS: Log in (now much improved!) to save this article

Risky Institutions: Political Regimes and the Cost of Public Borrowing in Early Modern Italy

Listed author(s):
  • Chilosi, David

By analyzing a newly compiled data set of interest rates on public annuities in early modern Italy, this article finds that the cost of borrowing fell in spite of growing debts and stagnating fiscal revenues. Feudalism and clerical interference increased the cost of borrowing, while parliaments, wars, and centralized fiscal institutions mattered little. The constitutional representation of creditors may have meant significant markups for republican oligarchs. These results cast doubts on the claim that the growth of absolutism was at the root of Italy's economic decline.

(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0022050714000631
File Function: link to article abstract page
Download Restriction: no

Article provided by Cambridge University Press in its journal The Journal of Economic History.

Volume (Year): 74 (2014)
Issue (Month): 03 (September)
Pages: 887-915

as
in new window

Handle: RePEc:cup:jechis:v:74:y:2014:i:03:p:887-915_00
Contact details of provider: Postal:
Cambridge University Press, UPH, Shaftesbury Road, Cambridge CB2 8BS UK

Web page: http://journals.cambridge.org/jid_JEH
Email:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

as
in new window


  1. Weir, David R., 1989. "Tontines, Public Finance, and Revolution in France and England, 1688–1789," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(01), pages 95-124, March.
  2. De Long, J Bradford & Shleifer, Andrei, 1993. "Princes and Merchants: European City Growth before the Industrial Revolution," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 36(2), pages 671-702, October.
  3. Velde, François R. & Weir, David R., 1992. "The Financial Market and Government Debt Policy in France, 1746–1793," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 52(01), pages 1-39, March.
  4. K. Kivanç Karaman & Sevket Pamuk, 2011. "Different Paths to the Modern State in Europe: The interaction between domestic political economy and interstate competition," Europe in Question Discussion Paper Series of the London School of Economics (LEQs) 7, London School of Economics / European Institute.
  5. Dincecco,Mark, 2013. "Political Transformations and Public Finances," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9781107617759, October.
  6. Oliver Volckart, 2002. "No Utopia: Government Without Territorial Monopoly in Medieval Central Europe," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 158(2), pages 325-325, June.
  7. Bailey,Roy E., 2005. "The Economics of Financial Markets," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521612807, October.
  8. Munro, John H., 2007. "The usury doctrine and urban public finances in late-medieval Flanders (1220 - 1550): rentes (annuities), excise taxes, and income transfers from the poor to the rich," MPRA Paper 11012, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Jan 2008.
  9. Plümper, Thomas & Troeger, Vera E., 2007. "Efficient Estimation of Time-Invariant and Rarely Changing Variables in Finite Sample Panel Analyses with Unit Fixed Effects," Political Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 15(02), pages 124-139, March.
  10. Munro, John H., 2002. "The medieval origins of the 'Financial Revolution': usury, rentes, and negotiablity," MPRA Paper 10925, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Sep 2002.
  11. Drelichman, Mauricio & Voth, Hans-Joachim, 2011. "Serial defaults, serial profits: Returns to sovereign lending in Habsburg Spain, 1566-1600," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 1-19, January.
  12. Peter Spufford, 2006. "From Antwerp and Amsterdam to London: The Decline of Financial Centres in Europe," De Economist, Springer, vol. 154(2), pages 143-175, June.
  13. Broadberry, Stephen, 2013. "Accounting For The Great Divergence," CAGE Online Working Paper Series 160, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
  14. North, Douglass C. & Weingast, Barry R., 1989. "Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 49(04), pages 803-832, December.
  15. David Chilosi & Oliver Volckart, 2010. "Good or bad money?: debasement, society and the state in the late Middle Ages," Economic History Working Papers 27946, London School of Economics and Political Science, Department of Economic History.
  16. Volckart, Oliver, 2004. "The economics of feuding in late medieval Germany," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 41(3), pages 282-299, July.
  17. Sussman, Nathan & Yafeh, Yishay, 2006. "Institutional Reforms, Financial Development and Sovereign Debt: Britain 1690 1790," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 66(04), pages 906-935, December.
  18. Chilosi, David & Murphy, Tommy E. & Studer, Roman & Tunçer, A. Coşkun, 2013. "Europe's many integrations: Geography and grain markets, 1620–1913," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 50(1), pages 46-68.
  19. Bell, Adrian & Sutcliffe, Charles, 2010. "Valuing medieval annuities: Were corrodies underpriced?," Explorations in Economic History, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 142-157, April.
  20. Dincecco, Mark, 2009. "Fiscal Centralization, Limited Government, and Public Revenues in Europe, 1650–1913," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 69(01), pages 48-103, March.
  21. Fratianni, Michele & Spinelli, Franco, 2006. "Italian city-states and financial evolution," European Review of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 10(03), pages 257-278, December.
  22. Regina Grafe, 2012. "Distant Tyranny: Markets, Power, and Backwardness in Spain, 1650-1800," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, number 9625, March.
  23. Flandreau, Marc & Flores, Juan H., 2009. "Bonds and Brands: Foundations of Sovereign Debt Markets, 1820–1830," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 69(03), pages 646-684, September.
  24. Dincecco, Mark, 2009. "Political regimes and sovereign credit risk in Europe, 1750–1913," European Review of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 13(01), pages 31-63, April.
  25. Volckart, Oliver, 2000. "The open constitution and its enemies: competition, rent seeking, and the rise of the modern state," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 1-17, May.
  26. Volckart, Oliver, 2002. "Central Europe's way to a market economy, 1000 1800," European Review of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 6(03), pages 309-337, December.
  27. Michele Fratianni, 2006. "Government Debt, Reputation and Creditors’ Protections: The Tale of San Giorgio," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 10(4), pages 487-506, December.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cup:jechis:v:74:y:2014:i:03:p:887-915_00. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Keith Waters)

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis using RePEc data.