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Government Debt, Reputation and Creditors’ Protections: The Tale of San Giorgio

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  • Michele Fratianni

Abstract

San Giorgio (1407–1805) was a formal association aimed at protecting creditors’ rights and reducing the risk of debt repudiation by the Republic of Genoa. The behavior of this institution is broadly consistent with debt models that predict lending if lenders can impose big penalties on debtors, and models in which lenders can differentiate between excusable and inexcusable defaults. San Giorgio shareholders enjoyed low credit risk but also lower returns on capital than those prevailing on comparable foreign assets for which creditors’ protection mechanisms were lacking. The Republic’s quid pro quo was a low cost of financing. Differences in credit risk were an important explanation of differences in long-term interest rates across countries in 16th and 17th century Europe, a point not sufficiently emphasized by the literature. Copyright Oxford University Press Science+Business Media, LLC 2006

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  • Michele Fratianni, 2006. "Government Debt, Reputation and Creditors’ Protections: The Tale of San Giorgio," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 10(4), pages 487-506, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:revfin:v:10:y:2006:i:4:p:487-506
    DOI: 10.1007/s10679-006-9006-7
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    Cited by:

    1. Leonor Freire Costa & Susana Münch Miranda, 2023. "Reputational recovery under political instability: Public debt in Portugal, 1641–83," Economic History Review, Economic History Society, vol. 76(3), pages 871-891, August.
    2. William N. Goetzmann, 2015. "Bubble Investing: Learning from History," NBER Working Papers 21693, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Mitchener, Kris James & Weidenmier, Marc D., 2010. "Supersanctions and sovereign debt repayment," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(1), pages 19-36, February.
    4. William Roberds & Francois R. Velde, 2014. "Early Public Banks," Working Paper Series WP-2014-3, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
    5. Chilosi, David, 2014. "Risky Institutions: Political Regimes and the Cost of Public Borrowing in Early Modern Italy," The Journal of Economic History, Cambridge University Press, vol. 74(3), pages 887-915, September.
    6. Michele Fratianni, 2009. "The Evolutionary Chain of International Financial Centers," Springer Books, in: Alberto Zazzaro & Michele Fratianni & Pietro Alessandrini (ed.), The Changing Geography of Banking and Finance, edition 1, chapter 12, pages 251-276, Springer.
    7. Andolfatto, David & Berentsen, Aleksander & Waller, Christopher, 2016. "Monetary policy with asset-backed money," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 164(C), pages 166-186.
    8. Chilosi, David & Schulze, Max-Stephan & Volckart, Oliver, 2016. "Benefits of empire? Capital market integration north and south of the Alps, 1350-1800," Economic History Working Papers 65346, London School of Economics and Political Science, Department of Economic History.
    9. Stefano Ugolini, 2018. "The Historical Evolution of Central Banking," Post-Print hal-01887004, HAL.
    10. Kris James Mitchener & Marc D. Weidenmier, 2005. "Supersanctions and Sovereign Debt Repayment," NBER Working Papers 11472, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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