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Reverse-share-tenancy and Marshallian Inefficiency: Landowners’ bargaining power and sharecroppers’ productivity

  • Hagos, Hosaena Gebru
  • Holden, Stein T.

While there are ample empirical studies that claim the potential disincentive effects of sharecropping arrangements, the existing literature is shallow in explaining why share tenancy contracts are prevalent and diffusing in many developing countries. Using a unique tenant-landlord matched dataset from the Tigray region of Ethiopia, we are able to show how the tenants’ strategic response to the varying economic and tenure-security status of the landlords can explain sharecroppers’ productivity differentials.

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Paper provided by International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) in its series IFPRI discussion papers with number 1270.

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Date of creation: 2013
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Handle: RePEc:fpr:ifprid:1270
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  1. Aryal, Jeetendra P. & Holden, Stein T., 2011. "Livestock and Land Share Contracts in a Hindu Society," CLTS Working Papers 7/11, Centre for Land Tenure Studies, Norwegian University of Life Sciences.
  2. Stein T. Holden & Klaus Deininger & Hosaena Ghebru, 2007. "Impacts of Low-Cost Land Certification on Investment and Productivity," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 91(2), pages 359-373.
  3. Holden, Stein & Shiferaw, Bekele & Pender, John L., 2001. "Market imperfections and land productivity in the Ethiopian Highlands:," EPTD discussion papers 76, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
  4. Bezabih, Mintewab & Holden, Stein, 2010. "The Role of Land Certification in Reducing Gender Gaps in Productivity in Rural Ethiopia," Discussion Papers dp-10-23-efd, Resources For the Future.
  5. Li, Guo & Rozelle, Scott & Brandt, Loren, 1998. "Tenure, land rights, and farmer investment incentives in China," Agricultural Economics of Agricultural Economists, International Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 19(1-2), September.
  6. Stein Holden & Klaus Deininger & Hosaena Ghebru, 2011. "Tenure Insecurity, Gender, Low-cost Land Certification and Land Rental Market Participation in Ethiopia," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 47(1), pages 31-47.
  7. Marcel Fafchamps, 2004. "Market Institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa: Theory and Evidence," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262062364, June.
  8. Deininger, Klaus & Ali, Daniel Ayalew & Holden, Stein & Zevenbergen, Jaap, 2007. "Rural land certification in Ethiopia : process, initial impact, and implications for other African countries," Policy Research Working Paper Series 4218, The World Bank.
  9. John Pender & Marcel Fafchamps, 2006. "Land Lease Markets and Agricultural Efficiency in Ethiopia," Journal of African Economies, Centre for the Study of African Economies (CSAE), vol. 15(2), pages 251-284, June.
  10. Li, Guo & Rozelle, Scott & Brandt, Loren, 1998. "Tenure, land rights, and farmer investment incentives in China," Agricultural Economics, Blackwell, vol. 19(1-2), pages 63-71, September.
  11. Al, C. & Arcand, J.L. & Ethier, F., 1996. "Moral Hazard and Marshallian Inefficiency: Evidence from Tunisia," Cahiers de recherche 9605, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
  12. Gavian, Sarah & Ehui, Simeon, 1999. "Measuring the production efficiency of alternative land tenure contracts in a mixed crop-livestock system in Ethiopia," Agricultural Economics, Blackwell, vol. 20(1), pages 37-49, January.
  13. Joseph E. Stiglitz, 1973. "Incentives and Risk-Sharing in Sharecropping," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 353, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  14. Sadoulet, Elisabeth & Fukui, Seiichi & Janvry, Alan de, 1994. "Efficient share tenancy contracts under risk: The case of two rice-growing villages in Thailand," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 225-243, December.
  15. Bellemare, Marc F., 2010. "Insecure Land Rights and Share Tenancy in Madagascar," MPRA Paper 23640, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  16. Macours, Karen, 2014. "Ethnic divisions, contract choice, and search costs in the Guatemalan land rental market," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 1-18.
  17. Menale Kassie & Stein Holden, 2007. "Sharecropping efficiency in Ethiopia: threats of eviction and kinship," Agricultural Economics, International Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 37(2-3), pages 179-188, 09.
  18. Jeffrey M. Wooldridge, 2004. "Inverse probability weighted estimation for general missing data problems," CeMMAP working papers CWP05/04, Centre for Microdata Methods and Practice, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
  19. Holden, Stein T. & Ghebru, Hosaena, 2011. "Household Welfare Effects of Low-cost Land Certification in Ethiopia," CLTS Working Papers 3/11, Centre for Land Tenure Studies, Norwegian University of Life Sciences.
  20. Naresh Sharma & Jean Dreze, 1996. "Sharecropping in a North Indian Village," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 33(1), pages 1-39.
  21. Shaban, Radwan Ali, 1987. "Testing between Competing Models of Sharecropping," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 95(5), pages 893-920, October.
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