Designing Unemployment Insurance for Developing Countries
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References listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
KeywordsSaving Accounts; Incomplete Markets; Moral Hazard; UISA; Mexico; Informality; Unemployment Insurance; Job Search;
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- H55 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Social Security and Public Pensions
- I38 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Welfare, Well-Being, and Poverty - - - Government Programs; Provision and Effects of Welfare Programs
- J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-DGE-2018-04-23 (Dynamic General Equilibrium)
- NEP-IAS-2018-04-23 (Insurance Economics)
- NEP-LAB-2018-04-23 (Labour Economics)
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