Unemployment Insurance Fraud and Optimal Monitoring
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Other versions of this item:
- David L. Fuller & B. Ravikumar & Yuzhe Zhang, 2015. "Unemployment Insurance Fraud and Optimal Monitoring," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(2), pages 249-290, April.
- David L. Fuller & B. Ravikumar & Yuzhe Zhang, 2012. "Unemployment insurance fraud and optimal monitoring," Working Papers 2012-024, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
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- David L. Fuller & B. Ravikumar & Yuzhe Zhang, 2015.
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- David L. Fuller & B. Ravikumar & Yuzhe Zhang, 2012. "Unemployment insurance fraud and optimal monitoring," Working Papers 2012-024, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Cristina LINCARU & Speranta PÎRCIOG & Draga Atanasiu, 2016. "A Model Of A System Of Monitoring And Alert System Of The Risk Of Unemployment – Romanian Case," Regional Science Inquiry, Hellenic Association of Regional Scientists, vol. 0(3), pages 125-145, December.
- Stéphane Auray & David L. Fuller, 2020.
"Eligibility, experience rating, and unemployment insurance take‐up,"
Quantitative Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 11(3), pages 1059-1107, July.
- Stéphane Auray & David L. Fuller, 2018. "Eligibility, Experience Rating, and Unemployment Insurance Take-up," Working Papers 2018-18, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
- Stéphane Auray & David L. Fuller, 2020. "Eligibility, experience rating, and unemployment insurance take‐up," Post-Print hal-03385921, HAL.
- Stéphane Auray & David L. Fuller, 2020. "Eligibility, experience rating, and unemployment insurance take‐up," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03385921, HAL.
- Stéphane Auray & David L. Fuller, 2020. "Eligibility, experience rating, and unemployment insurance take‐up," Sciences Po publications info:hdl:2441/5f63rk8j8i8, Sciences Po.
- Long, Iain W. & Polito, Vito, 2015. "Cash-in-Hand, Benefit Fraud and Unemployment Insurance," Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2015/4, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section.
- Martin Gervais & Lawrence Warren & Reza Boostani, 2022.
"Optimal unemployment insurance in a directed search model,"
Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 60(4), pages 1473-1496, October.
- Martin Gervais, 2012. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance in a Directed Search Model," 2012 Meeting Papers 1177, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- David L. Fuller & B. Ravikumar & Yuzhe Zhang, 2015.
"Unemployment Insurance Fraud and Optimal Monitoring,"
American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 7(2), pages 249-290, April.
- David L. Fuller & B. Ravikumar & Yuzhe Zhang, 2012. "Unemployment insurance fraud and optimal monitoring," Working Papers 2012-024, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
- Yuzhe Zhang & B Ravikumar & David Fuller, 2014. "Unemployment Insurance Fraud and Optimal Monitoring," 2014 Meeting Papers 1191, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- Georges Dionne, 2012.
"The Empirical Measure of Information Problems with Emphasis on Insurance Fraud and Dynamic Data,"
Cahiers de recherche
1233, CIRPEE.
- Dionne, Georges, 2012. "The empirical measure of information problems with emphasis on insurance fraud and dynamic data," Working Papers 12-10, HEC Montreal, Canada Research Chair in Risk Management.
- Auray, Stéphane & Fuller, David L. & Lkhagvasuren, Damba, 2019.
"Unemployment insurance take-up rates in an equilibrium search model,"
European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 112(C), pages 1-31.
- Stéphane Auray & David L. Fuller & damba Lkhagvasuren, 2013. "Unemployment Insurance Take-up Rate"s in an Equilibrium Search Model," Working Papers 2013-12, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
- David Fuller & Damba Lkhagvasuren & Stephane Auray, 2018. "Unemployment Insurance Take-up Rates in an Equilibrium Search Model," 2018 Meeting Papers 496, Society for Economic Dynamics.
- David Fuller & Stephane Auray & Damba Lkhagvasuren, 2013. "Unemployment Insurance Take-up Rates in an Equilibrium Search Model," Working Papers 13001, Concordia University, Department of Economics.
- Auray Stéphane & Fuller David & Lkhagvasuren Damba, 2017. "Unemployment Insurance Take-up Rates in an Equilibrium Search Model," Working Papers 2017-58, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
- Stéphane Auray & David L. Fuller & Damba Lkhagvasuren, 2018. "Unemployment Insurance Take-up Rates in an Equilibrium Search Model," Working Papers 2018-14, Center for Research in Economics and Statistics.
- Cristina LINCARU & Speranta PÃŽRCIOG & Draga Atanasiu, 2016. "A Model Of A System Of Monitoring And Alert System Of The Risk Of Unemployment €“ Romanian Case," Regional Science Inquiry, Hellenic Association of Regional Scientists, vol. 0(3), pages 125-145, December.
- repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/5f63rk8j8i8vlpr3b1ernvsg0u is not listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- H24 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Personal Income and Other Nonbusiness Taxes and Subsidies
- J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
- J65 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment Insurance; Severance Pay; Plant Closings
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