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How Do Lead Banks Use Their Private Information about Loan Quality in the Syndicated Loan Market?

Author

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  • Balasubramanyan, Lakshmi

    (Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland)

  • Berger, Allen N.

    (University of South Carolina, Wharton Financial Institutions Center)

  • Koepke, Matthew

    (Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland)

Abstract

Little is known about how lead banks in the syndicated loan market use their private information about loan quality. We formulate and test two hypotheses, the Signaling Hypothesis and Sophisticated Syndicate Hypothesis. To measure private information, we use Shared National Credit (SNC) internal loan ratings, which we make comparable across banks using concordance tables. We find that favorable private information is associated with higher loan retention by lead banks for term loans, consistent with empirical domination of the Signaling Hypothesis, while neither hypothesis dominates for revolvers. Differences in syndicate structure at least partially explain this disparity.

Suggested Citation

  • Balasubramanyan, Lakshmi & Berger, Allen N. & Koepke, Matthew, 2016. "How Do Lead Banks Use Their Private Information about Loan Quality in the Syndicated Loan Market?," Working Papers (Old Series) 1616, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, revised 29 Nov 2017.
  • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedcwp:1616
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Besanko, David & Thakor, Anjan V., 1987. "Competitive equilibrium in the credit market under asymmetric information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 167-182, June.
    2. Berger, Allen N & Udell, Gregory F, 1995. "Relationship Lending and Lines of Credit in Small Firm Finance," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 68(3), pages 351-381, July.
    3. Besanko, David & Thakor, Anjan V, 1987. "Collateral and Rationing: Sorting Equilibria in Monopolistic and Competitive Credit Markets," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 28(3), pages 671-689, October.
    4. Bester, Helmut, 1987. "The role of collateral in credit markets with imperfect information," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 31(4), pages 887-899, June.
    5. Aramonte, Sirio & Lee, Seung Jung & Stebunovs, Viktors, 2015. "Risk Taking and Low Longer-term Interest Rates: Evidence from the U.S. Syndicated Loan Market," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2015-68, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US).
    6. Berndt, Antje & Gupta, Anurag, 2009. "Moral hazard and adverse selection in the originate-to-distribute model of bank credit," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(5), pages 725-743, July.
    7. Bester, Helmut, 1985. "Screening vs. Rationing in Credit Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(4), pages 850-855, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Stijn Claessens & Andy Law & Teng Wang, 2018. "How do credit ratings affect bank lending under capital constraints?," BIS Working Papers 747, Bank for International Settlements.
    2. Bidder, Rhys & Krainer, John & Shapiro, Adam Hale, 2017. "De-leveraging or de-risking? How banks cope with loss," Working Paper Series 2017-3, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    lead bank; private information; loan sales; syndication;

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G28 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Government Policy and Regulation

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