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Do Lead Arrangers Retain Their Lead Shares?

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Abstract

We examine how lead arrangers’ ownership stakes in syndicated loans evolve after origination, complementing prior research on lead shares at origination. Lead arrangers tend to retain shares in bankheld loans but frequently sell shares in loans distributed to institutional investors, typically within days of origination. The frequency of these loan sales has increased over time, aligning with the rise of the originate-to-distribute model. Importantly, we find no evidence that loan sales are associated with worse performance. Additional evidence suggests that exposure through other loans, temporary retention during syndication, and reputation concerns help mitigate information asymmetries in the syndicated loan market.

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  • Kristian S. Blickle & Quirin Fleckenstein & Sebastian Hillenbrand & Anthony Saunders, 2020. "Do Lead Arrangers Retain Their Lead Shares?," Staff Reports 922, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    • Handle: RePEc:fip:fednsr:87916
    Note: Revised January 2026. Previous title: “The Myth of the Lead Arranger’s Share.”
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    Cited by:

    1. Matthieu Chavaz & David Elliott, 2020. "Separating retail and investment banking: evidence from the UK," Bank of England working papers 892, Bank of England.
    2. Dagostino, Ramona & Gao, Janet & Ma, Pengfei, 2023. "Partisanship in loan pricing," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 150(3).
    3. Kristian S. Blickle & Cecilia Parlatore & Anthony Saunders, 2021. "Specialization in Banking," Staff Reports 967, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
    4. Sina, A. & Billio, M. & Dufour, A. & Rocciolo, F. & Varotto, S., 2025. "The systemic risk of leveraged and covenant-lite loan syndications," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 97(C).
    5. Carvalho, Daniel & Gao, Janet & Ma, Pengfei, 2023. "Loan spreads and credit cycles: The role of lenders’ personal economic experiences," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 148(2), pages 118-149.
    6. Iñaki Aldasoro & Sebastian Doerr & Haonan Zhou, 2025. "Non-bank lending during crises," Review of Finance, European Finance Association, vol. 29(6), pages 1809-1832.
    7. Miguel Faria-e-Castro & Radhakrishnan Gopalan & Avantika Pal & Juan M. Sanchez & Vijay Yerramilli, 2022. "EBITDA Add-backs in Debt Contracting: A Step Too Far?," Working Papers 2022-029, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
    8. Degl’Innocenti, Marta & Frigerio, Marco & Zhou, Si, 2022. "Development banks and the syndicate structure: Evidence from a world sample," Journal of Empirical Finance, Elsevier, vol. 66(C), pages 99-120.
    9. Steven Ongena & Alex Osberghaus & Glenn Schepens, 2024. "Joining Forces: Why Banks Syndicate Credit," Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper Series 24-80, Swiss Finance Institute.
    10. Dahiya, Sandeep & Hallak, Issam & Matthys, Thomas, 2025. "Cash holdings and relationship lending," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 94(C).
    11. Sharjil M. Haque & Anya V. Kleymenova, 2023. "Private Equity and Debt Contract Enforcement: Evidence from Covenant Violations," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2023-018, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
    12. Blickle, Kristian & Santos, João A.C., 2024. "The costs of corporate debt overhang," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).
    13. Mueller, Isabella & Nguyen, Huyen & Nguyen, Trang, 2025. "Carbon transition risk and corporate loan securitization," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 63(C).
    14. Abhishek Bhardwaj & Abhinav Gupta & Sabrina T. Howell, 2025. "Leveraged Payouts: How Using New Debt to Pay Returns in Private Equity Affects Firms, Employees, Creditors, and Investors," Working Papers 25-12, Center for Economic Studies, U.S. Census Bureau.

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    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage
    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General

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