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Pipeline Risk in Leveraged Loan Syndication

Author

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  • Max Bruche
  • Frederic Malherbe
  • Ralf R. Meisenzahl

Abstract

Leveraged term loans are typically arranged by banks but distributed to institutional investors. Using novel data, we find that to elicit investors' willingness to pay, arrangers expose themselves to pipeline risk: They have to retain larger shares when investors are willing to pay less than expected. We argue that the retention of such problematic loans creates a debt overhang problem. Consistent with this, we find that the materialization of pipeline risk for an arranger reduces its subsequent arranging and lending activity. Aggregate time series exhibit a similar pattern, which suggests that the informational friction we identify could amplify the credit cycle.

Suggested Citation

  • Max Bruche & Frederic Malherbe & Ralf R. Meisenzahl, 2017. "Pipeline Risk in Leveraged Loan Syndication," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2017-048, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.).
  • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedgfe:2017-48
    DOI: 10.17016/FEDS.2017.048
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    File URL: https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds/files/2017048pap.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Katrina Ellis & Roni Michaely & Maureen O'Hara, 2000. "When the Underwriter Is the Market Maker: An Examination of Trading in the IPO Aftermarket," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 55(3), pages 1039-1074, June.
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    Cited by:

    1. Cortina Lorente,Juan Jose & Didier Brandao,Tatiana & Schmukler,Sergio L., 2020. "Global Corporate Debt during Crises : Implications of Switching Borrowing across Markets," Policy Research Working Paper Series 9142, The World Bank.
    2. Michael R. Roberts & Michael Schwert, 2020. "Interest Rates and the Design of Financial Contracts," NBER Working Papers 27195, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Aldasoro, Iñaki & Barth, Andreas, 2017. "Syndicated loans and CDS positioning," ESRB Working Paper Series 58, European Systemic Risk Board.
    4. Rustom M. Irani & Rajkamal Iyer & Ralf R. Meisenzahl & José-Luis Peydró, 2018. "The rise of shadow banking: evidence from capital regulation," Economics Working Papers 1652, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra, revised Jul 2020.
    5. Florian Heider & Farzad Saidi & Glenn Schepens, 2019. "Life below Zero: Bank Lending under Negative Policy Rates," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 32(10), pages 3728-3761.
    6. Delis, Manthos D. & Kim, Suk-Joong & Politsidis, Panagiotis N. & Wu, Eliza, 2021. "Regulators vs. markets: Are lending terms influenced by different perceptions of bank risk?," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 122(C).
    7. Friederike Niepmann & Tim Schmidt-Eisenlohr, 2018. "Global Investors, the Dollar, and U.S. Credit Conditions," CESifo Working Paper Series 7288, CESifo.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Debt Overhang; Lead Arranger Share; Leveraged Loans; Pipeline Risk; Syndicated Loans;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
    • G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage
    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General

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