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Pipeline Risk in Leveraged Loan Syndication

Author

Listed:
  • Max Bruche
  • Frederic Malherbe
  • Ralf R. Meisenzahl

Abstract

Leveraged term loans are typically arranged by banks but distributed to institutional investors. Using novel data, we find that to elicit investors' willingness to pay, arrangers expose themselves to pipeline risk: They have to retain larger shares when investors are willing to pay less than expected. We argue that the retention of such problematic loans creates a debt overhang problem. Consistent with this, we find that the materialization of pipeline risk for an arranger reduces its subsequent arranging and lending activity. Aggregate time series exhibit a similar pattern, which suggests that the informational friction we identify could amplify the credit cycle.

Suggested Citation

  • Max Bruche & Frederic Malherbe & Ralf R. Meisenzahl, 2017. "Pipeline Risk in Leveraged Loan Syndication," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2017-048, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US).
  • Handle: RePEc:fip:fedgfe:2017-48
    DOI: 10.17016/FEDS.2017.048
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    File URL: https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/feds/files/2017048pap.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Katrina Ellis & Roni Michaely & Maureen O'Hara, 2000. "When the Underwriter Is the Market Maker: An Examination of Trading in the IPO Aftermarket," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 55(3), pages 1039-1074, June.
    2. Aramonte, Sirio & Lee, Seung Jung & Stebunovs, Viktors, 2015. "Risk Taking and Low Longer-term Interest Rates: Evidence from the U.S. Syndicated Loan Market," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2015-68, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US).
    3. Ivashina, Victoria, 2009. "Asymmetric information effects on loan spreads," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(2), pages 300-319, May.
    4. Bahaj, Saleem & Malherbe, Frédéric, 2016. "A positive analysis of bank behaviour under capital requirements," CEPR Discussion Papers 11607, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    5. Benveniste, Lawrence M. & Spindt, Paul A., 1989. "How investment bankers determine the offer price and allocation of new issues," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 343-361.
    6. Jenkinson, Tim & Ljungqvist, Alexander, 2001. "Going Public: The Theory and Evidence on How Companies Raise Equity Finance," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, edition 2, number 9780198295990.
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    Cited by:

    1. Aldasoro, Iñaki & Barth, Andreas, 2017. "Syndicated loans and CDS positioning," ESRB Working Paper Series 58, European Systemic Risk Board.
    2. Rustom M. Irani & Rajkamal Iyer & Ralf R. Meisenzahl & José-Luis Peydró, 2018. "The rise of shadow banking: evidence from capital regulation," Economics Working Papers 1652, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
    3. Heider, Florian & Saidi, Farzad & Schepens, Glenn, 2018. "Life below zero: Bank lending under negative policy rates," CEPR Discussion Papers 13191, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Friederike Niepmann & Tim Schmidt-Eisenlohr, 2018. "Global Investors, the Dollar, and U.S. Credit Conditions," CESifo Working Paper Series 7288, CESifo Group Munich.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Debt Overhang ; Lead Arranger Share ; Leveraged Loans ; Pipeline Risk ; Syndicated Loans;

    JEL classification:

    • G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
    • G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage
    • G30 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - General

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