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IPPP Risks and opportunities an economic perspective

Author

Listed:
  • Julie de Brux

    (Sorbonne Business School and Studies and propspective manager)

  • Frederic Marty

    (Ofce sciences-po,)

Abstract

This article analyzes some of the issues raised by institutionalized public-private partnerships in an economic perspective. We demonstrate that although they may address some of the main limits of purely contractual public-private partnerships, such as the issues of control, know-how transfer, or additional financial cost, they may induce some intrinsic risks, related to alterations of the contractual incentive structure and judicial challenges. Based on economic theory, we stem some recommendations and comments about the adequacy of legal requirements with economic normative views.

Suggested Citation

  • Julie de Brux & Frederic Marty, 2014. "IPPP Risks and opportunities an economic perspective," Documents de Travail de l'OFCE 2014-11, Observatoire Francais des Conjonctures Economiques (OFCE).
  • Handle: RePEc:fce:doctra:1411
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    File URL: http://www.ofce.sciences-po.fr/pdf/dtravail/WP2014-11.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Frédéric Marty, 2014. "De la soutenabilité budgétaire des contrats de partenariat public-privé," GREDEG Working Papers 2014-35, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), University of Nice Sophia Antipolis.
    2. repec:eee:socmed:v:187:y:2017:i:c:p:276-286 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    Keywords

    public-private partnerships; hybrid structures; incentives;

    JEL classification:

    • H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
    • L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy

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