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Contests with money and time: Experimental evidence on overbidding in all-pay auctions

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  • Adriana Breaban
  • Charles N. Noussair
  • Andreea Victoria Popescu

Abstract

Competition for a prize frequently takes the form of dedicating time toward winning a contest. Those who spend more time become more likely to obtain the prize. We model this competition as an all-pay auction under incomplete information, and report an experiment in which expenditures and rewards are in terms of time. In the experiment, subjects must stay in the laboratory doing nothing for an initially prespecified length of time. However, they can bid, in terms of time, to leave early. The auction has an all-pay structure, so that if an individual does not submit the highest bid within her group, she must stay for the additional time that she bid. We correlate behavior in this game with behavior in an isomorphic all-pay auction played with money bids. We also consider how two measures of sophistication, the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) score, and performance on a probability calibration task, correlate with behavior. We find strong similarities in overall behavior between the auctions conducted with money and with time. Bidding greater than equilibrium levels is typical, and as a consequence, average earnings are negative in both auctions. Thus, the result that there is overdissipation of rent in all-pay auctions extends to competition in terms of time.

Suggested Citation

  • Adriana Breaban & Charles N. Noussair & Andreea Victoria Popescu, 2019. "Contests with money and time: Experimental evidence on overbidding in all-pay auctions," Experimental Economics Center Working Paper Series 2019-04, Experimental Economics Center, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University.
    • Handle: RePEc:exc:wpaper:2019-04
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    File URL: http://excen.gsu.edu/workingpapers/GSU_EXCEN_WP_2019-04.pdf
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    Cited by:

    1. is not listed on IDEAS
    2. David Bruner & Caleb Cox & David M. McEvoy & Brock Stoddard, 2022. "Strategic thinking in contests," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 25(3), pages 942-973, June.
    3. Nobuyuki Hanaki & Ali I. Ozkes, 2023. "Strategic environment effect and communication," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 26(3), pages 588-621, July.
    4. Beiyu Tang & Hongpeng Fu & Ying Cheng Wu, 2023. "On reservation prices in the all‐pay contest with correlated information," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 44(7), pages 3932-3943, October.
    5. Hsiao, Yu-Chin & Kemp, Simon & Servátka, Maroš & Ward, Matt & Zhang, Le, 2021. "Time Costs and Search Behavior," MPRA Paper 105412, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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