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With which countries do tax havens share information?

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  • Katarzyna Bilicka and Clemens Fuest

Abstract

In recent years tax havens and offshore financial centres have come under increasing political pressure to cooperate with other countries in matters of taxation and efforts to crowd back tax evasion and avoidance. As a result many tax havens have signed tax information exchange agreements (TIEAs). In order to comply with OECD standards tax havens are obliged to sign at least 12 TIEAs with other countries. This paper investigates how tax havens have chosen their partner countries. We ask whether they have signed TIEAs with countries to which they have strong economic links or whether they have systematically avoided doing this, so that information exchange remains ineffective. We analyse 555 TIEAs signed by tax havens in the years 2008-2011 and find that on average tax havens have signed more TIEAs with countries to which they have stronger economic links. Our analysis thus suggests that tax havens do not systematically undermine tax information exchange by signing TIEAs with irrelevant countries. However, this does not mean that they exchange information with all important partner countries.

Suggested Citation

  • Katarzyna Bilicka and Clemens Fuest, 2012. "With which countries do tax havens share information?," EUI-RSCAS Working Papers 6, European University Institute (EUI), Robert Schuman Centre of Advanced Studies (RSCAS).
  • Handle: RePEc:erp:euirsc:p0308
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Konrad, Kai A. & Stolper, Tim B.M., 2016. "Coordination and the fight against tax havens," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 96-107.
    2. Braun, Julia & Weichenrieder, Alfons, 2015. "Does exchange of information between tax authorities influence multinationals' use of tax havens?," ZEW Discussion Papers 15-015, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
    3. Lukas Menkhoff & Jakob Miethe, 2017. "Dirty Money Coming Home: Capital Flows into and out of Tax Havens," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1711, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    4. Niels Johannesen & Gabriel Zucman, 2014. "The End of Bank Secrecy? An Evaluation of the G20 Tax Haven Crackdown," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 6(1), pages 65-91, February.
    5. Weichenrieder, Alfons J. & Xu, Fangying, 2015. "Are tax havens good? Implications of the crackdown on secrecy," SAFE Working Paper Series 111, Research Center SAFE - Sustainable Architecture for Finance in Europe, Goethe University Frankfurt.
    6. Miethe, Jakob & Menkhoff, Lukas, 2017. "Dirty money coming home: Capital flows into and out of tax havens," Annual Conference 2017 (Vienna): Alternative Structures for Money and Banking 168082, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
    7. repec:hal:wpaper:halshs-00665054 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H26 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Tax Evasion and Avoidance
    • H77 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Intergovernmental Relations; Federalism
    • H87 - Public Economics - - Miscellaneous Issues - - - International Fiscal Issues; International Public Goods

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