Information Sharing and International Taxation: A Primer
The sharing between national tax authorities of taxpayer-specific information has emerged over the last few years as a—probably ‘the’—central issue on the international tax policy agenda. Yet this refocusing of the debate on international taxation—away from parametric tax coordination and towards strengthening information exchange—has gone largely unnoticed in the public finance literature. This paper gives an overview of this increasingly important area of international taxation, reviewing the key economic, legal, and practical concepts and issues bearing on the analysis and implementation of information exchange, and providing an account of recent policy initiatives and emerging theoretical insights. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2006
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