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Combining Dutch Presumptive Capital Income Tax and US Qualified Intermediaries to Set Forth a New System of International Savings Taxation

  • Marcel Gérard

Beyond the traditional debates over information exchange vs flat taxation at source, legislative advances have produced interesting innovations and suggestions concerning how to tax international savings. We examine some of these advances, which we then use to set forth and investigate a proposal for European and international savings taxation. That proposition combines the outcome of a recent Dutch reform and lessons from the US qualified intermediaries mechanism. We show that such a system exhibits the same desirable properties as exchange of information, but potentially at reduced compliance cost, and is sustainable within a repeated game framework.

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Paper provided by CESifo Group Munich in its series CESifo Working Paper Series with number 1340.

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Date of creation: 2004
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Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1340
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  1. repec:knz:cofedp:0306 is not listed on IDEAS
  2. Wolfgang Eggert & Martin Kolmar, 2003. "The Taxation of Financial Capital under Asymmetric Information and the Tax-Competition Paradox," CESifo Working Paper Series 1074, CESifo Group Munich.
  3. Cnossen,Sijbren, 2002. "Tax policy in the european union, A review of issues and options," Research Memorandum 023, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
  4. Philippe Bacchetta & Maria Paz Espinosa, 1993. "Information Sharing and Tax Competition Among Governments," CEPR Financial Markets Paper 0028, European Science Foundation Network in Financial Markets, c/o C.E.P.R, 77 Bastwick Street, London EC1V 3PZ..
  5. Peter Sørensen, 1994. "From the global income tax to the dual income tax: Recent tax reforms in the Nordic countries," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 57-79, February.
  6. repec:knz:cofedp:0307 is not listed on IDEAS
  7. Philippe Bacchetta & María Espinosa, 2000. "Exchange-of-Information Clauses in International Tax Treaties," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 275-293, May.
  8. Roger H. Gordon, 1990. "Can Capital Income Taxes Survive in Open Economies?," NBER Working Papers 3416, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  9. Slemrod, Joel, 2004. "Are corporate tax rates, or countries, converging?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(6), pages 1169-1186, June.
  10. Wolfgang Eggert & Martin Kolmar, 2000. "Residence-based Capital Taxation: Why Information is Voluntarily Exchanged and why it is not," CESifo Working Paper Series 402, CESifo Group Munich.
  11. Sijbren Cnossen, 2002. "Tax Policy in the European Union: A Review of Issues and Options," CESifo Working Paper Series 758, CESifo Group Munich.
  12. Huizinga, Harry & Nielsen, Soren Bo, 2003. "Withholding taxes or information exchange: the taxation of international interest flows," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(1), pages 39-72, January.
  13. Gerard, Marcel & Hadhri, Moncef, 1994. "The European Tax Game and Welfare," Public Finance = Finances publiques, , vol. 49(Supplemen), pages 211-31.
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