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Bargaining over Tax Information Exchange

  • May Elsayyad
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    This paper empirically studies recent treaty signings between tax havens and OECD countries as the outcome of a bargaining process over treaty form. Havens can decide not to sign an agreement, to sign a tax information exchange agreement or to sign a double taxation convention. We use a highly stylized bargaining model to develop testable hypotheses with regards to the type of agreement signed. We show that the main determinants of treaty signing are a haven's bargaining power and good governance. We show that it is easier to renegotiate an already existent treaty to include information exchange than to pressure countries with no existent agreement.

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    File URL: http://www.tax.mpg.de/RePEc/mpi/wpaper/Tax-MPG-RPS-2012-02.pdf
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    Paper provided by Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance in its series Working Papers with number bargaining_over_tax_information_exchange.

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    Length: 37 pages
    Date of creation: Feb 2012
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:mpi:wpaper:bargaining_over_tax_information_exchange
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    1. Hong, Qing & Smart, Michael, 2010. "In praise of tax havens: International tax planning and foreign direct investment," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 82-95, January.
    2. May Elsayyad & Kai A. Konrad, 2011. "Fighting Multiple Tax Havens," Working Papers fighting_multiple_tax_hav, Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance.
    3. Richard Chisik & Ronald B. Davies, 2001. "Asymmetric FDI and Tax-Treaty Bargaining: Theory and Evidence"," University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers 2001-2, University of Oregon Economics Department, revised 01 Jun 2002.
    4. Philippe Bacchetta & Maria Paz Espinosa, 1993. "Information Sharing and Tax Competition Among Governments," CEPR Financial Markets Paper 0028, European Science Foundation Network in Financial Markets, c/o C.E.P.R, 77 Bastwick Street, London EC1V 3PZ..
    5. H. Huizinga & Ga�tan Nicod�me, 2001. "Are international deposits tax-driven?," European Economy - Economic Papers 152, Directorate General Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN), European Commission.
    6. Dhammika Dharmapala, 2008. "What Problems and Opportunities are Created by Tax Havens?," Working Papers 0820, Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation.
    7. Slemrod, Joel & Wilson, John D., 2009. "Tax competition with parasitic tax havens," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(11-12), pages 1261-1270, December.
    8. Johannesen, Niels, 2010. "Imperfect tax competition for profits, asymmetric equilibrium and beneficial tax havens," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 253-264, July.
    9. Michael Keen & Jenny Ligthart, 2006. "Incentives and Information Exchange in International Taxation," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 163-180, May.
    10. Sophia Rabe-Hesketh & Anders Skrondal, 2012. "Multilevel and Longitudinal Modeling Using Stata, 3rd Edition," Stata Press books, StataCorp LP, edition 3, number mimus2, November.
    11. repec:ner:tilbur:urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-142606 is not listed on IDEAS
    12. Harry Huizinga & Søren Bo Nielsen, . "Withholding Taxes or Information Exchange: The Taxation of International Interest Flows," EPRU Working Paper Series 00-19, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics.
    13. Philippe Bacchetta & María Espinosa, 2000. "Exchange-of-Information Clauses in International Tax Treaties," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 7(3), pages 275-293, May.
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