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Rent Building, Rent Sharing A Panel Country-Industry Empirical Analysis

  • Paul Maarek
  • Philippe Askenazy
  • Gilbert Cette

    ()

    (THEMA, Universite de Cergy-Pontoise
    Paris School of Economic-CNRS, Cepremap, IZA and Banque de France
    Banque de France and Université de la Méditerranée (DEFI))

This paper aims to clarify the role of market regulations in rent creation and rent sharing. For each country-industry-year observation, the rent size (RS), measured by the value added price relative to the GDP price, is assumed to depend solely on direct anti-competitive regulations (ACR) on services and goods. The second step explains the rent sharing process by using the impact of our RS measure on the capital share. ACR on the good market increases rent size. RS increases the capital share but the magnitude highly depends on the bargaining power of the two alternative beneficiaries: workers and upstream industries.

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Paper provided by THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise in its series THEMA Working Papers with number 2012-33.

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Date of creation: 2012
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Handle: RePEc:ema:worpap:2012-33
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  1. Blanchard, Olivier J & Giavazzi, Francesco, 2001. "Macroeconomic Effects of Regulation and Deregulation in Goods and Labour Markets," CEPR Discussion Papers 2713, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  2. Douglas Gollin, 2002. "Getting Income Shares Right," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 110(2), pages 458-474, April.
  3. Judith A. Chevalier & David S. Scharfstein, 1994. "Capital Market Imperfections and Countercyclical Markups: Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 4614, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Azmat, Ghazala & Manning, Alan & Van Reenen, John, 2007. "Privatization, Entry Regulation and the Decline of Labour's Share of GDP: A Cross-Country Analysis of the Network Industries," CEPR Discussion Papers 6348, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  5. Spector, David, 2004. "Competition and the capital-labor conflict," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 25-38, February.
  6. Philippe Aghion & Peter Howitt, 2009. "The Economics of Growth," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262012634, June.
  7. Hernando Zuleta & Andrew T. Young, 2011. "Do Unions Increase Labor’s Shares? Evidence from US Industry-Level Data," Working Papers 10-06, Department of Economics, West Virginia University.
  8. Renaud Bourlès & Gilbert Cette & Jimmy Lopez & Jacques Mairesse & Giuseppe Nicoletti, 2013. "Do Product Market Regulations In Upstream Sectors Curb Productivity Growth? Panel Data Evidence For OECD Countries," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 95(5), pages 1750-1768, December.
  9. Machin, Stephen & Van Reenen, John, 1993. "Profit Margins and the Business Cycle: Evidence from UK Manufacturing Firms," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(1), pages 29-50, March.
  10. Young, Andrew T., 2010. "One of the things we know that ain't so: Is US labor's share relatively stable?," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 90-102, March.
  11. Van Reenen, John, 1994. "The Creation and Capture of Rents: Wages and Innovation in a Panel of UK Companies," CEPR Discussion Papers 1071, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  12. Andrea Bassanini & Romain Duval, 2009. "Unemployment, institutions and reform complementarities: Re-assessing the aggregate evidence for OECD countries," Post-Print halshs-00395144, HAL.
  13. Paul Conway & Giuseppe Nicoletti, 2006. "Product Market Regulation in the Non-Manufacturing Sectors of OECD Countries: Measurement and Highlights," OECD Economics Department Working Papers 530, OECD Publishing.
  14. Nicoletti, Giuseppe & Pryor, Frederic L., 2006. "Subjective and objective measures of governmental regulations in OECD nations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 59(3), pages 433-449, March.
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