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Human Rights Violations After 9/11 and the Role of Constitutional Constraints

Author

Listed:
  • Benedikt Goderis
  • Mila Versteeg

Abstract

After 9/11, the United States and its allies took measures to protect their citizens from future terrorist attacks. While these measures aim to increase security, they have often been criticized for violating human rights. But violating rights is difficult in a constitutional democracy with separated powers and checks and balances. This paper empirically investigates the effect of the post-9/11 terror threat on human rights. We find strong evidence of a systematic increase in rights violations in the United States and its ally countries after 9/11. When testing the importance of checks and balances, we find that this increase is significantly smaller in countries with independent judicial review (countermajoritarian checks) but did not depend on the presence of veto players in the legislative branch (majoritarian checks). These findings have important implications for constitutional debates on rights protection in times of emergency.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Benedikt Goderis & Mila Versteeg, 2009. "Human Rights Violations After 9/11 and the Role of Constitutional Constraints," Economics of Security Working Paper Series 11, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:diw:diweos:diweos11
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    Cited by:

    1. Antonis Adam & Evi Tsavou, 2024. "Assessing the effect of international terrorism on civil liberties using a potential outcomes framework," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 200(1), pages 201-236, July.
    2. Friedrich Schneider & Tilman Brück & Daniel Meierrieks, 2010. "The Economics of Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: A Survey (Part II)," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1050, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    3. Thorvaldur Gylfason, 2012. "From Collapse to Constitution: The Case of Iceland," CESifo Working Paper Series 3770, CESifo.
    4. Kneip, Sascha & Wagner, Aiko, 2017. "Rekonvaleszenz der Demokratie? Die Erholung bürgerlicher Freiheitsrechte im internationalen Vergleich," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 11(1), pages 1-23.
    5. Adam S. Chilton & Mila Versteeg, 2015. "The Failure of Constitutional Torture Prohibitions," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 44(2), pages 417-452.
    6. Michael Brzoska & Raphael Bossong & Eric van Um, 2011. "Security Economics in the European Context: Implications of the EUSECON Project," Economics of Security Working Paper Series 58, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    7. Bozzoli, Carlos & Müller, Cathérine, 2011. "Perceptions and attitudes following a terrorist shock: Evidence from the UK," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 27(S1), pages 89-106.
    8. Sam R. Bell & K. Chad Clay & Carla Martinez Machain, 2017. "The Effect of US Troop Deployments on Human Rights," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 61(10), pages 2020-2042, November.
    9. Timothy Besley & Torsten Persson, 2009. "Repression or Civil War?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(2), pages 292-297, May.

    More about this item

    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • K19 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Other
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • F52 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - National Security; Economic Nationalism

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