IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/diw/diweos/diweos11.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Human Rights Violations After 9/11 and the Role of Constitutional Constraints

Author

Listed:
  • Benedikt Goderis
  • Mila Versteeg

Abstract

After 9/11, the United States and its allies took measures to protect their citizens from future terrorist attacks. While these measures aim to increase security, they have often been criticized for violating human rights. But violating rights is difficult in a constitutional democracy with separated powers and checks and balances. This paper empirically investigates the effect of the post-9/11 terror threat on human rights. We find strong evidence of a systematic increase in rights violations in the United States and its ally countries after 9/11. When testing the importance of checks and balances, we find that this increase is significantly smaller in countries with independent judicial review (countermajoritarian checks) but did not depend on the presence of veto players in the legislative branch (majoritarian checks). These findings have important implications for constitutional debates on rights protection in times of emergency.
(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Suggested Citation

  • Benedikt Goderis & Mila Versteeg, 2009. "Human Rights Violations After 9/11 and the Role of Constitutional Constraints," Economics of Security Working Paper Series 11, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    • Handle: RePEc:diw:diweos:diweos11
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.diw.de/documents/publikationen/73/diw_01.c.354136.de/diw_econsec0011.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Darren W. Davis & Brian D. Silver, 2004. "Civil Liberties vs. Security: Public Opinion in the Context of the Terrorist Attacks on America," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 48(1), pages 28-46, January.
    2. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Cristian Pop-Eleches & Andrei Shleifer, 2004. "Judicial Checks and Balances," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 112(2), pages 445-470, April.
    3. Robert J. Barro & Rachel M. McCleary, 2005. "Which Countries Have State Religions?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 120(4), pages 1331-1370.
    4. La Porta, Rafael & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1997. "Legal Determinants of External Finance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(3), pages 1131-1150, July.
    5. La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert, 1999. "The Quality of Government," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(1), pages 222-279, April.
    6. Witold J. Henisz, 2002. "The institutional environment for infrastructure investment," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press and the Associazione ICC, vol. 11(2), pages 355-389.
    7. Axel Dreher & Martin Gassebner & Lars-H.R. Siemers, 2007. "Does Terror Threaten Human Rights? Evidence from Panel Data," KOF Working papers 07-156, KOF Swiss Economic Institute, ETH Zurich.
    8. Daniel Berkowitz & Karen Clay, 2006. "The Effect of Judicial Independence on Courts: Evidence from the American States," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 35(2), pages 399-440, June.
    9. Douglas M. Gibler & Meredith Reid Sarkees, 2004. "Measuring Alliances: the Correlates of War Formal Interstate Alliance Dataset, 1816–2000," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 41(2), pages 211-222, March.
    10. Puhani, Patrick A., 2012. "The treatment effect, the cross difference, and the interaction term in nonlinear “difference-in-differences” models," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 115(1), pages 85-87.
    11. Beck, Thorsten & Clarke, George & Groff, Alberto & Keefer, Philip & Walsh, Patrick, 2000. "New tools and new tests in comparative political economy - the database of political institutions," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2283, The World Bank.
    12. Marianne Bertrand & Esther Duflo & Sendhil Mullainathan, 2004. "How Much Should We Trust Differences-In-Differences Estimates?," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 119(1), pages 249-275.
    13. Poe, Steven C. & Tate, C. Neal, 1994. "Repression of Human Rights to Personal Integrity in the 1980s: A Global Analysis," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 88(4), pages 853-872, December.
    14. repec:bla:obuest:v:61:y:1999:i:0:p:631-52 is not listed on IDEAS
    15. Emilie M. Hafner-Burton & Kiyoteru Tsutsui, 2007. "Justice Lost! The Failure of International Human Rights Law To Matter Where Needed Most," Journal of Peace Research, Peace Research Institute Oslo, vol. 44(4), pages 407-425, July.
    16. Kristian Gleditsch, 2004. "A Revised List of Wars Between and Within Independent States, 1816-2002," International Interactions, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 30(3), pages 231-262, July.
    17. Keefer, Philip & Stasavage, David, 2003. "The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence, and the Credibility of Monetary Policy," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 97(3), pages 407-423, August.
    18. Ada Ferrer-i-Carbonell & Paul Frijters, 2004. "How Important is Methodology for the estimates of the determinants of Happiness?," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 114(497), pages 641-659, July.
    19. Arellano, M, 1987. "Computing Robust Standard Errors for Within-Groups Estimators," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 49(4), pages 431-434, November.
    20. Ai, Chunrong & Norton, Edward C., 2003. "Interaction terms in logit and probit models," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 80(1), pages 123-129, July.
    21. G. S. Maddala & Shaowen Wu, 1999. "A Comparative Study of Unit Root Tests with Panel Data and a New Simple Test," Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, Department of Economics, University of Oxford, vol. 61(S1), pages 631-652, November.
    22. Axel Dreher & Martin Gassebner & Lars-H. Siemers, 2010. "Does Terrorism Threaten Human Rights? Evidence from Panel Data," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 53(1), pages 65-93, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Friedrich Schneider & Tilman Brück & Daniel Meierrieks, 2010. "The Economics of Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: A Survey (Part I)," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1049, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    2. Antonis Adam & Evi Tsavou, 2024. "Assessing the effect of international terrorism on civil liberties using a potential outcomes framework," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 200(1), pages 201-236, July.
    3. Thorvaldur Gylfason, 2012. "From Collapse to Constitution: The Case of Iceland," CESifo Working Paper Series 3770, CESifo.
    4. Kneip, Sascha & Wagner, Aiko, 2017. "Rekonvaleszenz der Demokratie? Die Erholung bürgerlicher Freiheitsrechte im internationalen Vergleich," EconStor Open Access Articles and Book Chapters, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, vol. 11(1), pages 1-23.
    5. Adam S. Chilton & Mila Versteeg, 2015. "The Failure of Constitutional Torture Prohibitions," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 44(2), pages 417-452.
    6. Michael Brzoska & Raphael Bossong & Eric van Um, 2011. "Security Economics in the European Context: Implications of the EUSECON Project," Economics of Security Working Paper Series 58, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.
    7. Timothy Besley & Torsten Persson, 2009. "Repression or Civil War?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(2), pages 292-297, May.
    8. Bozzoli, Carlos & Müller, Cathérine, 2011. "Perceptions and attitudes following a terrorist shock: Evidence from the UK," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 27(S1), pages 89-106.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Beck, T.H.L., 2010. "Legal Institutions and Economic Development," Other publications TiSEM 8aa07b48-ce55-4cf6-8754-7, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    2. Axel Dreher & Martin Gassebner & Lars-H. R. Siemers, 2012. "Globalization, Economic Freedom, and Human Rights," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 56(3), pages 516-546, June.
    3. Buchen, Clemens, 2010. "Emerging economic systems in Central and Eastern Europe – a qualitative and quantitative assessment," EconStor Theses, ZBW - Leibniz Information Centre for Economics, number 37141, September.
    4. Andrei Shleifer & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Rafael La Porta, 2008. "The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 46(2), pages 285-332, June.
    5. Carlo Cambini & Laura Rondi, 2017. "Independent Agencies, Political Interference, And Firm Investment: Evidence From The European Union," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 55(1), pages 281-304, January.
    6. Juan C. Botero & Simeon Djankov & Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 2004. "The Regulation of Labor," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 119(4), pages 1339-1382.
    7. Martin Gassebner & Pierre-Guillaume Méon, 2010. "Where do Creditor Rights Matter? Creditor Rights, Political Constraints, and Cross-Border M&A Activity," Working Papers CEB 10-019.RS, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    8. Sébastien Marchand, 2012. "Legal Origin, Colonial Origins and Deforestation," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 32(2), pages 1653-1670.
    9. Joan Costa-Font & Nilesh Raut & Courtney H. Van Houtven, 2024. "Medicaid Expansion and the Mental Health of Spousal Caregivers," Review of Economics of the Household, Springer, vol. 22(3), pages 1047-1084, September.
    10. Papaioannou, Elias & Siourounis, Gregorios, 2008. "Economic and social factors driving the third wave of democratization," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 365-387, September.
    11. Ziebarth, Nicolas R. & Karlsson, Martin, 2010. "A natural experiment on sick pay cuts, sickness absence, and labor costs," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(11-12), pages 1108-1122, December.
    12. Mohammad Amin & Priya Ranjan, 2008. "When Does Legal Origin Matter?," Working Papers 080912, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
    13. Cassey Lee, 2007. "Legal Traditions and Competition Policy," Chapters, in: Paul Cook & Raul Fabella & Cassey Lee (ed.), Competitive Advantage and Competition Policy in Developing Countries, chapter 4, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    14. Djankov, Simeon & McLiesh, Caralee & Shleifer, Andrei, 2007. "Private credit in 129 countries," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 299-329, May.
    15. Beck, Thorsten & Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Levine, Ross, 2003. "Law, endowments, and finance," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 137-181, November.
    16. Lessmann, Christian & Markwardt, Gunther, 2010. "One Size Fits All? Decentralization, Corruption, and the Monitoring of Bureaucrats," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 38(4), pages 631-646, April.
    17. Sébastien MARCHAND, 2010. "Historical and Comparative Institutional Analysis: Evidences from Deforestation," Working Papers 201016, CERDI.
    18. Lars P. Feld & Stefan Voigt, 2004. "Making Judges Independent – Some Proposals Regarding the Judiciary," CESifo Working Paper Series 1260, CESifo.
    19. Jain, Pankaj K. & Kuvvet, Emre & Pagano, Michael S., 2017. "Corruption’s impact on foreign portfolio investment," International Business Review, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 23-35.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    human rights; terrorism; 9/11; checks and balances; constitutions; constitutional courts;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K19 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Other
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • F52 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - National Security; Economic Nationalism

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:diw:diweos:diweos11. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Bibliothek (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/diwbede.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.