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From Collapse to Constitution: The Case of Iceland

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  • Thorvaldur Gylfason

Abstract

Most of the time, crises precede constitutions. Following a brief review of relevant historical background, this article aims to show why Iceland, after its financial collapse in 2008, is now at last on the road to adopting a new constitution to replace the provisional constitution from 1944. The aim is also to show how the constitutional bill of 2011 came into being with significant help from the general public. Further, the article outlines some of the key provisions of the bill as well as why and how it differs from the current constitution. The article concludes by offering a brief discussion of some potential obstacles to the adoption of the bill in parliament, the role of the public, and some lessons from, and for, other countries.

Suggested Citation

  • Thorvaldur Gylfason, 2012. "From Collapse to Constitution: The Case of Iceland," CESifo Working Paper Series 3770, CESifo.
    • Handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_3770
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Thorvaldur Gylfason, 2012. "Constitutions: Financial Crisis Can Lead to Change," Challenge, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 55(5), pages 106-122.

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    JEL classification:

    • K10 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - General (Constitutional Law)

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