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Tightening Tensions: Fiscal Policy and Civil Unrest in South America, 1937–95

In: Fiscal Policy and Macroeconomic Performance

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  • Joachim Voth

    (Universitat Pompeu Fabra)

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  • Joachim Voth, 2013. "Tightening Tensions: Fiscal Policy and Civil Unrest in South America, 1937–95," Central Banking, Analysis, and Economic Policies Book Series, in: Luis Felipe Céspedes & Jordi Galí (ed.),Fiscal Policy and Macroeconomic Performance, edition 1, volume 17, chapter 3, pages 59-92, Central Bank of Chile.
    • Handle: RePEc:chb:bcchsb:v17c03pp59-92
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    9. Acemoglu, Daron, 2005. "Politics and economics in weak and strong states," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(7), pages 1199-1226, October.
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    11. James M. Poterba & Jürgen von Hagen, 1999. "Fiscal Institutions and Fiscal Performance," NBER Books, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, number pote99-1, March.
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