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Collateral, Central Bank Repos, and Systemic Arbitrage

Author

Listed:
  • Fecht, Falko
  • Nyborg, Kjell G
  • Rocholl, Jorg
  • Woschitz, Jiri

Abstract

Central banks are under increased scrutiny because of the rapid growth in, and composition of, their balance sheets. Therefore, understanding the processes that shape these balance sheets and their consequences is crucial. We contribute by studying an extensive dataset of banks' liquidity uptake and pledged collateral in central bank repos. We document systemic arbitrage whereby banks funnel credit risk and low-quality collateral to the central bank. Weaker banks use lower quality collateral to demand disproportionately larger amounts of central bank money (liquidity). This holds both before and after the financial crisis and may contribute to financial fragility and fragmentation.

Suggested Citation

  • Fecht, Falko & Nyborg, Kjell G & Rocholl, Jorg & Woschitz, Jiri, 2016. "Collateral, Central Bank Repos, and Systemic Arbitrage," CEPR Discussion Papers 11663, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:11663
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jakob Eberl & Christopher Weber, 2014. "ECB Collateral Criteria: A Narrative Database 2001–2013," ifo Working Paper Series 174, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich.
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    5. Itamar Drechsler & Thomas Drechsel & David Marques-Ibanez & Philipp Schnabl, 2016. "Who Borrows from the Lender of Last Resort?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 71(5), pages 1933-1974, October.
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    7. Bindseil, Ulrich, 2014. "Monetary Policy Operations and the Financial System," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780198716907.
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    Cited by:

    1. Nyborg, Kjell G., 2017. "Central bank collateral frameworks," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 198-214.
    2. Nyborg, Kjell G., 2017. "Reprint of: Central bank collateral frameworks," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 232-248.
    3. Fuhrer, Lucas Marc & Müller, Benjamin & Steiner, Luzian, 2017. "The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and security prices," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 292-311.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    banks; central bank; Collateral; collateral policy; financial fragmentation; financial stability; interbank market; liquidity; repo; systemic arbitrage;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
    • E51 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Money Supply; Credit; Money Multipliers
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • G12 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Asset Pricing; Trading Volume; Bond Interest Rates
    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages

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