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A Structural Model of the Retail Market for Illicit Drugs

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  • Gavazza, Alessandro
  • Galenianos, Manolis

Abstract

We estimate a model of illicit drugs markets using data on purchases of crack cocaine. Buyers are searching for high-quality drugs, but they determine drugs? quality (i.e., their purity) only after consuming them. Hence, sellers can rip off first-time buyers or can offer higher-quality drugs to induce buyers to purchase from them again. In equilibrium, a distribution of qualities persists. The estimated model implies that sellers? moral hazard reduces the average purity of drugs by approximately 20 percent and increases its dispersion more than fourfold. Moreover, increasing penalties may increase the purity and affordability of the drugs traded because doing so increases sellers? relative profitability of targeting loyal buyers versus first-time buyers.

Suggested Citation

  • Gavazza, Alessandro & Galenianos, Manolis, 2015. "A Structural Model of the Retail Market for Illicit Drugs," CEPR Discussion Papers 10363, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:10363
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    Cited by:

    1. Luigi Paciello & Andrea Pozzi & Nicholas Trachter, 2019. "Price Dynamics With Customer Markets," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 60(1), pages 413-446, February.
    2. Leong, Kaiwen & Li, Huailu & Xu, Haibo, 2019. "Effect of Enforcement Shock on Pushers' Activities: Evidence from an Asian Drug-Selling Gang," IZA Discussion Papers 12083, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    3. David Bardey & Denis Gromb & David Martimort & Jérôme Pouyet, 2020. "Controlling Sellers Who Provide Advice: Regulation and Competition," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 68(3), pages 409-444, September.
    4. Carrieri, Vincenzo & Madio, Leonardo & Principe, Francesco, 2019. "Light cannabis and organized crime: Evidence from (unintended) liberalization in Italy," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 113(C), pages 63-76.
    5. Liu, Lu, 2019. "Non-salient fees in the mortgage market," Bank of England working papers 819, Bank of England.
    6. Bhaskar, V. & Linacre, Robin & Machin, Stephen, 2019. "The economic functioning of online drugs markets," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 159(C), pages 426-441.
    7. Nicolas Eschenbaum & Helge Liebert, 2021. "Dealing with Uncertainty: The Value of Reputation in the Absence of Legal Institutions," Papers 2107.11314, arXiv.org.
    8. Manolis Galenianos & Alessandro Gavazza, 2017. "A Structural Model of the Retail Market for Illicit Drugs," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 107(3), pages 858-896, March.
    9. Pinter, Gabor & Uslu, Semih, 2022. "Comparing search and intermediation frictions across markets," Bank of England working papers 974, Bank of England.
    10. Arthur Campbell & C. Matthew Leister & Yves Zenou, 2020. "Word‐of‐mouth communication and search," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 51(3), pages 676-712, September.
    11. Auriol, Emmanuelle & Mesnard, Alice & Perrault, Tiffanie, 2019. "Defeating Crime? An Economic Analysis of Cannabis Legalization Policies," CEPR Discussion Papers 13814, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    12. Gary Biglaiser & Fei Li & Charles Murry & Yiyi Zhou, 2020. "Intermediaries and product quality in used car markets," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 51(3), pages 905-933, September.
    13. Solimine, Philip & Isaac, R. Mark, 2023. "Reputation and market structure in experimental platforms," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 205(C), pages 528-559.
    14. Lennon, Conor & Shohfi, Tom, 2021. "Unbridled spirit: Illicit markets for bourbon whiskey," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 191(C), pages 1025-1045.
    15. Manolis Galenianos & Alessandro Gavazza, 2022. "Regulatory Interventions in Consumer Financial Markets: The Case of Credit Cards," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 20(5), pages 1897-1932.
    16. Bahamazava, Katsiaryna & Marchese, Carla & Privileggi, Fabio, 2023. "A Cournot equilibrium between Dark Net Market and Street market," Department of Economics and Statistics Cognetti de Martiis. Working Papers 202302, University of Turin.
    17. Manuel Sánchez-Pérez & María Belén Marín-Carrillo & María Dolores Illescas-Manzano & Zohair Souilim, 2023. "Understanding the illegal drug supply chain structure: a value chain analysis of the supply of hashish to Europe," Palgrave Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 10(1), pages 1-13, December.
    18. Leong, Kaiwen & Li, Huailu & Xu, Haibo, 2018. "Exploiting the Unbanked: Evidence from Singapore's Unlicensed Moneylending Market," IZA Discussion Papers 11786, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Drugs; Moral hazard; Product quality; Search;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
    • L65 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Manufacturing - - - Chemicals; Rubber; Drugs; Biotechnology; Plastics

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