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Government spending shocks, sovereign risk and the exchange rate regime

  • Jasper Lukkezen


  • Dennis Bonam (VU and Tinbergen)
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    Keynesian theory predicts output responses upon a fiscal expansion in a small open economy to be larger under fixed than under floating exchange rates. We analyse the effects of fiscal expansions using a New Keynesian model and find that the reverse holds in the presence of sovereign default risk. By raising sovereign risk, a fiscal expansion worsens private credit conditions and reduces consumption; these adverse effects are offset by exchange-rate depreciation and a rise in exports under a float, yet not under a peg. We find that output responses can even be negative when exchange rates are held fixed, suggesting the possibility of expansionary fiscal consolidations.

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    Paper provided by CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis in its series CPB Discussion Paper with number 263.

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    Date of creation: Jan 2014
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:cpb:discus:263
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