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Government spending shocks, sovereign risk and the exchange rate regime

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  • Jasper Lukkezen

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  • Dennis Bonam (VU en Tinbergen)

Abstract

Keynesian theory predicts output responses upon a fiscal expansion in a small open economy to be larger under fixed than under floating exchange rates. We analyse the effects of fiscal expansions using a New Keynesian model and find that the reverse holds in the presence of sovereign default risk. By raising sovereign risk, a fiscal expansion worsens private credit conditions and reduces consumption; these adverse effects are offset by exchange-rate depreciation and a rise in exports under a float, yet not under a peg. We find that output responses can even be negative when exchange rates are held fixed, suggesting the possibility of expansionary fiscal consolidations.

Suggested Citation

  • Jasper Lukkezen & Dennis Bonam (VU en Tinbergen), 2014. "Government spending shocks, sovereign risk and the exchange rate regime," CPB Discussion Paper 263, CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis.
  • Handle: RePEc:cpb:discus:263
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    Cited by:

    1. Foroni, Claudia & Ravazzolo, Francesco & Sadaba, Barbara, 2018. "Assessing the predictive ability of sovereign default risk on exchange rate returns," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 242-264.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy

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