Early Retirement Incentives and Student Achievement
Early retirement incentives (ERIs) are increasingly prevalent in education as districts seek to close budget gaps by replacing expensive experienced teachers with lower-cost newer teachers. Combined with the aging of the teacher workforce, these ERIs are likely to change the composition of teachers dramatically in the coming years. We use exogenous variation from an ERI program in Illinois in the mid-1990s to provide the first evidence in the literature of the effects of large-scale teacher retirements on student achievement. We find the program did not reduce test scores; likely, it increased them, with positive effects most pronounced in lower-SES schools.
|Date of creation:||2013|
|Contact details of provider:|| Postal: Poschingerstrasse 5, 81679 Munich|
Phone: +49 (89) 9224-0
Fax: +49 (89) 985369
Web page: http://www.cesifo-group.de
More information through EDIRC
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Caroline M. Hoxby, 2001.
"All School Finance Equalizations are Not Created Equal,"
The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
Oxford University Press, vol. 116(4), pages 1189-1231.
- Caroline M. Hoxby, 1998. "All School Finance Equalizations Are Not Created Equal," NBER Working Papers 6792, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Cory Koedel & Michael Podgursky & Shishan Shi, 2013.
"Teacher Pension Systems, the Composition of the Teaching Workforce, and Teacher Quality,"
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management,
John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 32(3), pages 574-596, June.
- Cory Koedel & Michael Podgursky, 2011. "Teacher Pension Systems, the Composition of the Teaching Workforce, and Teacher Quality," Working Papers 1109, Department of Economics, University of Missouri, revised 10 Apr 2012.
- Caroline M. Hoxby, 2000. "The Effects of Class Size on Student Achievement: New Evidence from Population Variation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 115(4), pages 1239-1285.
- Robert M. Costrell & Michael Podgursky, 2009. "Peaks, Cliffs, and Valleys: The Peculiar Incentives in Teacher Retirement Systems and Their Consequences for School Staffing," Education Finance and Policy, MIT Press, vol. 4(2), pages 175-211, April.
- Matthew M. Chingos & Martin R. West, 2012. "Do More Effective Teachers Earn More Outside the Classroom?," Education Finance and Policy, MIT Press, vol. 7(1), pages 8-43, January.
- Charles T. Clotfelter & Helen F. Ladd & Jacob L. Vigdor, 2006.
"Teacher-Student Matching and the Assessment of Teacher Effectiveness,"
Journal of Human Resources,
University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 41(4).
- Charles T. Clotfelter & Helen F. Ladd & Jacob L. Vigdor, 2006. "Teacher-Student Matching and the Assessment of Teacher Effectiveness," NBER Working Papers 11936, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Wiswall, Matthew, 2013. "The dynamics of teacher quality," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 61-78.
- Sass, Tim R. & Hannaway, Jane & Xu, Zeyu & Figlio, David N. & Feng, Li, 2012. "Value added of teachers in high-poverty schools and lower poverty schools," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 104-122.
- Christopher Jepsen & Steven Rivkin, 2009. "Class Size Reduction and Student Achievement: The Potential Tradeoff between Teacher Quality and Class Size," Journal of Human Resources, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 44(1).
- Kristine M. Brown & Ron A. Laschever, 2012. "When They're Sixty-Four: Peer Effects and the Timing of Retirement," American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, American Economic Association, vol. 4(3), pages 90-115, July.
When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ces:ceswps:_4347. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Klaus Wohlrabe)
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.