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Shareholder Primacy and the Trajectory of UK Corporate Governance

Author

Listed:
  • John Armour
  • Simon Deakin
  • Suzanne J. Konzelmann

Abstract

Core institutions of UK corporate governance, in particular those relating to takeovers, board structure and directors’ duties, are strongly orientated towards a norm of shareholder primacy. Beyond the core, in particular at the intersection of insolvency and employment law, stakeholder interests are better represented, thanks to European Community influence. Moreover, institutional shareholders are redirecting their investment strategies away from a focus on short-term returns, in such a way as to favour stakeholder-inclusive practices. We therefore suggest that the UK system is currently in a state of flux and that the debate over shareholder primacy has not been concluded.

Suggested Citation

  • John Armour & Simon Deakin & Suzanne J. Konzelmann, 2003. "Shareholder Primacy and the Trajectory of UK Corporate Governance," Working Papers wp266, Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge.
    • Handle: RePEc:cbr:cbrwps:wp266
    Note: PRO-2
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    File URL: https://www.jbs.cam.ac.uk/cbrwp266/
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    5. Shuangge Wen & Jingchen Zhao, 2020. "The Commons, the Common Good and Extraterritoriality: Seeking Sustainable Global Justice through Corporate Responsibility," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 12(22), pages 1-21, November.
    6. Azimjon Kuvandikov & Andrew Pendleton & David Higgins, 2014. "Employment Change after Takeovers: The Role of Executive Ownership," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 52(2), pages 191-236, June.
    7. Simon Deakin & Aristea Koukiadaki, 2008. "Governance Processes, Employee Voice and Performance Outcomes in the Construction of Heathrow Terminal 5," Working Papers wp368, Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge.
    8. Simon Deakin & Richard Hobbs & Sue Konzelmann & Frank Wilkinson, 2005. "Anglo-American corporate governance and the employment relationship: a case to answer?," Working Papers wp308, Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge.
    9. Labadi, Moufida & Nekhili, Mehdi, 2012. "Structure de propriété et partage de la valeur ajoutée : application aux entreprises françaises non financières du SBF120," Revue de la Régulation - Capitalisme, institutions, pouvoirs, Association Recherche et Régulation, vol. 12.
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    11. Catherine Barnard & Simon Deakin & Richard Hobbs, 2004. "Reflexive law, corporate social responsibility and the evolution of labour standards: the case of working time," Working Papers wp294, Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge.
    12. Stephen P. Ferris & Nilanjan Sen & Emre Unlu, 2009. "An International Analysis of Dividend Payment Behavior," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(3-4), pages 496-522.
    13. Paul Bridgen & Marek Naczyk, 2019. "Shareholders of the World United? Organized Labour's Preferences on Corporate Governance under Pension Fund Capitalism in the United States, United Kingdom and France," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 57(3), pages 651-675, September.
    14. Rachelle Belinga & Blanche Segrestin, 2018. "Principals and stewards? An exploration of the role of institutional investors in corporate governance," Post-Print hal-01791931, HAL.
    15. Lukáš Marek, 2012. "Institutional Differences Between the British and German Economic Models: Corporate Sector and Labour Market [Institucionální odlišnosti britského a německého ekonomického modelu. S důrazem na fire," Acta Oeconomica Pragensia, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2012(1), pages 25-38.
    16. Ding, Yuan & Richard, Jacques & Stolowy, Hervé, 2008. "Towards an understanding of the phases of goodwill accounting in four Western capitalist countries: From stakeholder model to shareholder model," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 33(7-8), pages 718-755.
    17. Stephen P. Ferris & Nilanjan Sen & Emre Unlu, 2009. "An International Analysis of Dividend Payment Behavior," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(3‐4), pages 496-522, April.
    18. Barone, Elisabetta & Ranamagar, Nathan & Solomon, Jill F., 2013. "A Habermasian model of stakeholder (non)engagement and corporate (ir)responsibility reporting," Accounting forum, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 163-181.
    19. Simon Deakin & Richard Hobbs, 2006. "False dawn for CSR? Shifts in regulatory policy and the response of the corporate and financial sectors in Britain," Working Papers wp333, Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge.
    20. Adegbite, Emmanuel & Amaeshi, Kenneth & Nakajima, Chizu, 2013. "Multiple influences on corporate governance practice in Nigeria: Agents, strategies and implications," International Business Review, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 524-538.
    21. Chris Rees & Michael Gold, 2020. "Re‐connecting capitalism: prospects for the regulatory reform of the employee interest in UK takeovers," Industrial Relations Journal, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(6), pages 502-516, November.
    22. Suzanne J. Konzelmann & Frank Wilkinson & Neil Conway, 2007. "Corporate Governance and Employment Relations," Working Papers wp355, Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge.
    23. Lippert, Inge, 2008. "Perspektivenverschiebungen in der Corporate Governance: Neuere Ansätze und Studien der Corporate-Governance-Forschung," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Knowledge, Production Systems and Work SP III 2008-302, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    corporate governance; stakeholding; hostile takeovers; company law; insolvency; employee representation; shareholder activism;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law
    • K31 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Labor Law

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