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Shareholder Primacy and the Trajectory of UK Corporate Governance

Author

Listed:
  • John Armour
  • Simon Deakin
  • Suzanne J. Konzelmann

Abstract

Core institutions of UK corporate governance, in particular those relating to takeovers, board structure and directors’ duties, are strongly orientated towards a norm of shareholder primacy. Beyond the core, in particular at the intersection of insolvency and employment law, stakeholder interests are better represented, thanks to European Community influence. Moreover, institutional shareholders are redirecting their investment strategies away from a focus on short-term returns, in such a way as to favour stakeholder-inclusive practices. We therefore suggest that the UK system is currently in a state of flux and that the debate over shareholder primacy has not been concluded.

Suggested Citation

  • John Armour & Simon Deakin & Suzanne J. Konzelmann, 2003. "Shareholder Primacy and the Trajectory of UK Corporate Governance," Working Papers wp266, Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge.
  • Handle: RePEc:cbr:cbrwps:wp266
    Note: PRO-2
    as

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    File URL: https://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/fileadmin/user_upload/centre-for-business-research/downloads/working-papers/wp266.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Conyon, Martin J. & Girma, Sourafel & Thompson, Steve & Wright, Peter W., 2002. "The impact of mergers and acquisitions on company employment in the United Kingdom," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 31-49, January.
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    3. A Cosh & P Guest, 2001. "The Long-Run Performance of Hostile Takeovers: UK Evidence," Working Papers wp215, Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge.
    4. Crespi, R. & Renneboog, L.D.R., 2000. "United we stand : Corporate Monitoring by Shareholder Coalitions in the UK," Discussion Paper 2000-18, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    5. Howard Gospel & Andrew Pendleton, 2003. "Finance, Corporate Governance and the Management of Labour: A Conceptual and Comparative Analysis," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 41(3), pages 557-582, September.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Corinne Perraudin & Héloïse Petit, & Antoine Rebérioux, 2013. "Worker Information and Firm Disclosure Analysis on French Linked Employer–Employee Data," Industrial Relations: A Journal of Economy and Society, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(1), pages 134-161, January.
    2. Neil Conway & Simon Deakin & Suzanne Konzelmann & Héloïse Petit & Antoine Rebérioux & Frank Wilkinson, 2008. "The Influence of Stock Market Listing on Human Resource Management: Evidence for France and Britain," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 46(4), pages 631-673, December.
    3. Simon Deakin & Aristea Koukiadaki, 2008. "Governance Processes, Employee Voice and Performance Outcomes in the Construction of Heathrow Terminal 5," Working Papers wp368, Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge.
    4. Catherine Barnard & Simon Deakin & Richard Hobbs, 2004. "Reflexive law, corporate social responsibility and the evolution of labour standards: the case of working time," Working Papers wp294, Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge.
    5. Ding, Yuan & Richard, Jacques & Stolowy, Hervé, 2008. "Towards an understanding of the phases of goodwill accounting in four Western capitalist countries: From stakeholder model to shareholder model," Accounting, Organizations and Society, Elsevier, vol. 33(7-8), pages 718-755.
    6. Simon Deakin & Richard Hobbs, 2006. "False dawn for CSR? Shifts in regulatory policy and the response of the corporate and financial sectors in Britain," Working Papers wp333, Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge.
    7. Adegbite, Emmanuel & Amaeshi, Kenneth & Nakajima, Chizu, 2013. "Multiple influences on corporate governance practice in Nigeria: Agents, strategies and implications," International Business Review, Elsevier, vol. 22(3), pages 524-538.
    8. Lippert, Inge, 2008. "Perspektivenverschiebungen in der Corporate Governance: Neuere Ansätze und Studien der Corporate-Governance-Forschung," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Knowledge, Production Systems and Work SP III 2008-302, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
    9. Shiang-Min Meng, 2013. "Application of Laozi’s Daodejing to Current Corporate Governance," International Journal of Asian Social Science, Asian Economic and Social Society, vol. 3(10), pages 2114-2133, October.
    10. Azimjon Kuvandikov & Andrew Pendleton & David Higgins, 2014. "Employment Change after Takeovers: The Role of Executive Ownership," British Journal of Industrial Relations, London School of Economics, vol. 52(2), pages 191-236, June.
    11. Stephen P. Ferris & Nilanjan Sen & Emre Unlu, 2009. "An International Analysis of Dividend Payment Behavior," Journal of Business Finance & Accounting, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(3-4), pages 496-522.
    12. Lukáš Marek, 2012. "Institutional Differences Between the British and German Economic Models: Corporate Sector and Labour Market," Acta Oeconomica Pragensia, University of Economics, Prague, vol. 2012(1), pages 25-38.
    13. Labadi, Moufida & Nekhili, Mehdi, 2012. "Structure de propriété et partage de la valeur ajoutée : application aux entreprises françaises non financières du SBF120," Revue de la Régulation - Capitalisme, institutions, pouvoirs, Association Recherche et Régulation, vol. 12.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    corporate governance; stakeholding; hostile takeovers; company law; insolvency; employee representation; shareholder activism;

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
    • G34 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Mergers; Acquisitions; Restructuring; Corporate Governance
    • K22 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Business and Securities Law
    • K31 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Labor Law

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