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Catching-up and falling behind: Effects of learning in an R&D differential game with spillovers

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  • Bondarev, Anton
  • Greiner, Alfred

Abstract

In this paper we analyze the dynamics of an R&D differential game allowing for technological spillovers and sigmoid learning functions of multiproduct oligopolies. We demonstrate how the presence of learning together with spillovers may generate a rich set of outcomes, varying from constant leadership to catching-up and falling behind as well as from technology lock-in to a situation with a large number of high quality products. These types of outcomes are qualitatively different both from the single frm dynamics with learning and from the duopoly case with spillovers and without learning.

Suggested Citation

  • Bondarev, Anton & Greiner, Alfred, 2017. "Catching-up and falling behind: Effects of learning in an R&D differential game with spillovers," Working papers 2017/02, Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel.
  • Handle: RePEc:bsl:wpaper:2017/02
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Bondarev, Anton, 2018. "Robust policy schemes for R&D games with asymmetric information," Working papers 2018/01, Faculty of Business and Economics - University of Basel.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    endogenous market structure; learning by doing; technological spillovers; heterogeneous innovations; differential games;

    JEL classification:

    • C61 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods; Programming Models; Mathematical and Simulation Modeling - - - Optimization Techniques; Programming Models; Dynamic Analysis
    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L16 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Industrial Organization and Macroeconomics; Macroeconomic Industrial Structure
    • O32 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
    • O33 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Technological Change: Choices and Consequences; Diffusion Processes

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