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The fiscal and monetary institutions of CESEE countries

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  • Zsolt Darvas
  • Valentina Kostyleva

Abstract

This working paper by Zsolt Darvas and Valentina Kostyleva examines the role of fiscal and monetary institutions in macroeconomic stability and budgetary control in CESEE (central, eastern and south eastern European) countries in comparison to other OECD countries. A new budgetary discipline index suggests that fiscal institutions are weaker in most CESEE countries than in non-CESEE OECD countries. The sizeable debt/GDP ratio declines in CESEE before the crisis was largely...

Suggested Citation

  • Zsolt Darvas & Valentina Kostyleva, 2011. "The fiscal and monetary institutions of CESEE countries," Working Papers 494, Bruegel.
    • Handle: RePEc:bre:wpaper:494
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    Cited by:

    1. Capraru, Bogdan & Georgescu, George & Sprincean, Nicu, 2020. "An evaluation of IFIs impact on EU countries budget deficits," Working Papers of Romania Fiscal Council 201101, Romania Fiscal Council.
    2. Tóth, Csaba G., 2017. "Own or inherited? The effect of national fiscal rules after changes of government," MPRA Paper 81178, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Csaba G. Tóth & Dávid Berta, 2017. "Fiscal Rules," MNB Handbook, Magyar Nemzeti Bank (Central Bank of Hungary), vol. 2(14), pages 1-60.
    4. Csaba G. Tóth, 2019. "Valuable legacy? The effect of inherited fiscal rules," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 178(1), pages 3-30, January.
    5. Tóth G., Csaba, 2017. "A nemzeti költségvetési szabályok elterjedése és hatása Európában [The spread of national fiscal rules and their effect in Europe]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(11), pages 1119-1147.
    6. Căpraru, Bogdan & Georgescu, George & Sprincean, Nicu, 2022. "Do independent fiscal institutions cause better fiscal outcomes in the European Union?," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 46(2).
    7. Balatoni, András & Tóth G., Csaba, 2012. "Az új magyar adósságszabály értékelése [Assessment of the new regulations on debt]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(10), pages 1107-1137.

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