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A nemzeti költségvetési szabályok elterjedése és hatása Európában
[The spread of national fiscal rules and their effect in Europe]

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  • Tóth G., Csaba

Abstract

A nemzeti szintű költségvetési szabályok robbanásszerű európai elterjedése az elmúlt negyedszázadban több okra vezethető vissza. A szabályok bevezetésére, illetve a szabályrendszerek megerősítésére gyakran a költségvetési problémák által kikényszerített költségvetési kiigazítások keretében került sor, ám erősítette ezt a folyamatot az európai integráció is. Azok az országok, amelyek az európai adósságválság során nem szorultak külső segítségre, jellemzően szigorúbb költségvetési szabályrendszert alakítottak ki, ami azt jelezheti, hogy ez az eszköz képes lehet hozzájárulni a költségvetési fenntarthatósághoz. A saját adatbázison elvégzett ökonometriai kutatásunk is azt bizonyítja, hogy a nemzeti költségvetési szabályok konjunktúra időszakában erősítik a költségvetési fegyelmet. Továbbá azt találtuk, hogy a szabályok eredményessége szempontjából fontos az erős jogi háttér, a megfelelően rögzített célrendszer, a riasztási mechanizmus, az ellenőrző testület, valamint a szabályok működéséről szóló nyilvános diskurzus.* Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) kód: H60, H62, E62.

Suggested Citation

  • Tóth G., Csaba, 2017. "A nemzeti költségvetési szabályok elterjedése és hatása Európában [The spread of national fiscal rules and their effect in Europe]," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(11), pages 1119-1147.
  • Handle: RePEc:ksa:szemle:1732
    DOI: 10.18414/KSZ.2017.11.1119
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    1. Miklós Losoncz & Csaba G. Tóth, 2020. "Government Debt Reduction in the Old EU Member States: Is This Time Different?," Financial and Economic Review, Magyar Nemzeti Bank (Central Bank of Hungary), vol. 19(2), pages 28-54.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • H60 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - General
    • H62 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - Deficit; Surplus
    • E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy; Modern Monetary Theory

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