IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/imf/imfsdn/18-04.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Second-Generation Fiscal Rules; Balancing Simplicity, Flexibility, and Enforceability

Author

Listed:
  • Luc Eyraud
  • Xavier Debrun
  • Andrew Hodge
  • Victor Duarte Lledo
  • Catherine A Pattillo

Abstract

Fiscal rule frameworks have evolved significantly in response to the global financial crisis. Many countries have reformed their fiscal rules or introduced new ones with a view to enhancing the credibility of fiscal policy and providing a medium-term anchor. Enforcement and monitoring mechanisms have also been upgraded. However, these innovations have made the systems of rules more complicated to operate, while compliance has not improved. The SDN takes stock of past experiences, reviews recent reforms, and presents new research on the effectiveness of rules. It also proposes guiding principles for future reforms to strike a better balance between simplicity, flexibility, and enforceability. Read the blog

Suggested Citation

  • Luc Eyraud & Xavier Debrun & Andrew Hodge & Victor Duarte Lledo & Catherine A Pattillo, 2018. "Second-Generation Fiscal Rules; Balancing Simplicity, Flexibility, and Enforceability," IMF Staff Discussion Notes 18/04, International Monetary Fund.
  • Handle: RePEc:imf:imfsdn:18/04
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=45131
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Alberto Alesina & Guido Tabellini, 2007. "Bureaucrats or Politicians? Part I: A Single Policy Task," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(1), pages 169-179, March.
    2. Alberto Alesina, 2000. "The Political Economy of the Budget Surplus in the United States," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 3-19, Summer.
    3. repec:cup:cbooks:9781107160583 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Michal Andrle & John C Bluedorn & Luc Eyraud & Tidiane Kinda & Petya Koeva Brooks & Gerd Schwartz & Anke Weber, 2015. "Reforming Fiscal Governance in the European Union," IMF Staff Discussion Notes 15/9, International Monetary Fund.
    5. repec:eee:poleco:v:51:y:2018:i:c:p:69-92 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Julio Escolano & Vitor Gaspar, 2016. "Optimal Debt Policy Under Asymmetric Risk," IMF Working Papers 16/178, International Monetary Fund.
    7. Heinemann, Friedrich & Moessinger, Marc-Daniel & Yeter, Mustafa, 2018. "Do fiscal rules constrain fiscal policy? A meta-regression-analysis," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 51(C), pages 69-92.
    8. von Hagen, Jurgen & Harden, Ian J., 1995. "Budget processes and commitment to fiscal discipline," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(3-4), pages 771-779, April.
    9. Steven A. Symansky & Xavier Debrun & Natan P. Epstein, 2008. "A New Fiscal Rule; Should Israel “Go Swiss?”," IMF Working Papers 08/87, International Monetary Fund.
    10. Tapsoba, René, 2012. "Do National Numerical Fiscal Rules really shape fiscal behaviours in developing countries? A treatment effect evaluation," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 1356-1369.
    11. António Afonso & João Tovar Jalles, 2017. "Euro area time‐varying fiscal sustainability," International Journal of Finance & Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 22(3), pages 244-254, July.
    12. Beetsma, Roel & Debrun, Xavier & Sloof, Randolph, 2017. "The political economy of fiscal transparency and independent fiscal councils," CEPR Discussion Papers 12181, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    13. Alesina, Alberto & Drazen, Allan, 1991. "Why are Stabilizations Delayed," Foerder Institute for Economic Research Working Papers 275509, Tel-Aviv University > Foerder Institute for Economic Research.
    14. repec:nbr:nberch:13344 is not listed on IDEAS
    15. Byron F. Lutz & Glenn Follette, 2012. "Fiscal rules, what does the American experience tell us?," Finance and Economics Discussion Series 2012-38, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (US).
    16. Tabellini, Guido & Alesina, Alberto, 1990. "Voting on the Budget Deficit," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 80(1), pages 37-49, March.
    17. Henrique S. Basso & James Costain, 2016. "Fiscal Delegation in a Monetary Union with Decentralized Public Spending," CESifo Economic Studies, CESifo, vol. 62(2), pages 256-288.
    18. repec:bla:jcmkts:v:56:y:2018:i:3:p:504-519 is not listed on IDEAS
    19. Poterba, James M, 1996. "Budget Institutions and Fiscal Policy in the U.S. States," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(2), pages 395-400, May.
    20. Lars P. Feld & Alexander Kalb & Marc-Daniel Moessinger & Steffen Osterloh, 2013. "Sovereign bond market reactions to fiscal rules and no-bailout clauses – The Swiss experience," Working Papers 2013/27, Institut d'Economia de Barcelona (IEB).
    21. Olivier Blanchard & Giovanni Dell'Ariccia & Paolo Mauro, 2010. "Rethinking Macroeconomic Policy," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 42(s1), pages 199-215, September.
    22. Jeffrey Clemens & Stephen Miran, 2012. "Fiscal Policy Multipliers on Subnational Government Spending," American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, American Economic Association, vol. 4(2), pages 46-68, May.
    23. Badinger, Harald & Reuter, Wolf Heinrich, 2017. "The case for fiscal rules," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 334-343.
    24. Eugen Tereanu & Anita Tuladhar & Alejandro Simone, 2014. "Structural Balance Targeting and Output Gap Uncertainty," IMF Working Papers 14/107, International Monetary Fund.
    25. Bayoumi, Tamim & Goldstein, Morris & Woglom, Geoffrey, 1995. "Do Credit Markets Discipline Sovereign Borrowers? Evidence from the U.S. States," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 27(4), pages 1046-1059, November.
    26. J. Bradford DeLong & Lawrence H. Summers, 2012. "Fiscal Policy in a Depressed Economy," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 44(1 (Spring), pages 233-297.
    27. Cândida Ferreira, 2009. "Fiscal Behaviour in the European Union: Rules, Fiscal Decentralization and Government Indebtedness," Working Papers Department of Economics 2009/23, ISEG - Lisbon School of Economics and Management, Department of Economics, Universidade de Lisboa.
    28. Xavier Debrun & Laurent Moulin & Alessandro Turrini & Joaquim Ayuso-i-Casals & Manmohan S. Kumar, 2008. "Tied to the mast? National fiscal rules in the European Union," Economic Policy, CEPR;CES;MSH, vol. 23, pages 297-362, April.
    29. Feld, Lars P. & Kalb, Alexander & Moessinger, Marc-Daniel & Osterloh, Steffen, 2017. "Sovereign bond market reactions to no-bailout clauses and fiscal rules – The Swiss experience," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 319-343.
    30. Reuter, Wolf Heinrich, 2017. "When and why do countries break their national fiscal rules?," Working Papers 01/2017, German Council of Economic Experts / Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung.
    31. Till Cordes & Tidiane Kinda & Priscilla S Muthoora & Anke Weber, 2015. "Expenditure Rules; Effective Tools for Sound Fiscal Policy?," IMF Working Papers 15/29, International Monetary Fund.
    32. Charles Wyplosz, 2005. "Fiscal Policy: Institutions versus Rules," National Institute Economic Review, National Institute of Economic and Social Research, vol. 191(1), pages 64-78, January.
    33. Alberto Alesina, 2000. "The Political Economy of the Budget Surplus in the U.S," NBER Working Papers 7496, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    34. von Hagen, Jurgen, 1991. "A note on the empirical effectiveness of formal fiscal restraints," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 199-210, March.
    35. Julio Escolano, 2010. "A Practical Guide to Public Debt Dynamics, Fiscal Sustainability, and Cyclical Adjustment of Budgetary Aggregates," IMF Technical Notes and Manuals 10/02, International Monetary Fund.
    36. Grégory Claeys & Zsolt Darvas & Alvaro Leandro, 2016. "A proposal to revive the European Fiscal Framework," Policy Contributions 13490, Bruegel.
    37. Alesina, Alberto & Drazen, Allan, 1991. "Why Are Stabilizations Delayed?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1170-1188, December.
    38. Tetsuya Konuki & Mauricio Villafuerte, 2016. "Cyclical Behavior of Fiscal Policy among Sub-Saharan African Countries," IMF Departmental Papers / Policy Papers 16/09, International Monetary Fund.
    39. J. Bradford DeLong & Lawrence H. Summers, 2012. "Fiscal Policy in a Depressed Economy," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 43(1 (Spring), pages 233-297.
    40. Torben M. Andersen, 2013. "The Swedish Fiscal Policy Framework and Intermediate Fiscal Policy Targets," Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics (SJES), Swiss Society of Economics and Statistics (SSES), vol. 149(II), pages 231-248, June.
    41. Nina T Budina & Andrea Schaechter & Anke Weber & Tidiane Kinda, 2012. "Fiscal Rules in Response to the Crisis; Toward the "Next-Generation" Rules: A New Dataset," IMF Working Papers 12/187, International Monetary Fund.
    42. Bergman, U. Michael & Hutchison, Michael M. & Jensen, Svend E. Hougaard, 2016. "Promoting sustainable public finances in the European Union: The role of fiscal rules and government efficiency," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 44(C), pages 1-19.
    43. Robert A. J. Dur & Ben D. Peletier & Otto H. Swank, 1999. "Voting on the Budget Deficit: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1377-1381, December.
    44. Allen Schick, 2010. "Post-Crisis Fiscal Rules: Stabilising Public Finance while Responding to Economic Aftershocks," OECD Journal on Budgeting, OECD Publishing, vol. 10(2), pages 1-18.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Westerhout, Ed & Beetsma, Roel, 2019. "A comparison of nominal and indexed debt under fiscal constraints," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 91(C), pages 177-194.
    2. Antonio Fatás & Atish R. Ghosh & Ugo Panizza & Andrea F Presbitero, 2019. "The Motives to Borrow," IMF Working Papers 19/101, International Monetary Fund.
    3. Mario Marcel, 2019. "Getting Rules into Policymakers’ Hands: A Review of Rules-based Macro Policy," Economic Policy Papers Central Bank of Chile 66, Central Bank of Chile.
    4. Maxime Menuet, 2019. "Fiscal rule and shock amplification : A stochastic endogenous growth model," Working Papers hal-02153887, HAL.
    5. Feld, Lars P., 2018. "The quest for fiscal rules," Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics 18/09, Walter Eucken Institut e.V..
    6. Debrun, Xavier & Jonung, Lars, 2019. "Under threat: Rules-based fiscal policy and how to preserve it," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 142-157.
    7. Kamps, Christophe & Leiner-Killinger, Nadine, 2019. "Taking stock of the functioning of the EU fiscal rules and options for reform," Occasional Paper Series 231, European Central Bank.
    8. Grégory Levieuge & Yannick Lucotte & Florian Pradines-Jobet, 2019. "The Cost of Banking Crises: Does the Policy Framework Matter?," Working papers 712, Banque de France.
    9. International Monetary Fund, 2018. "Chile; Selected Issues Paper," IMF Staff Country Reports 18/312, International Monetary Fund.
    10. repec:fru:finjrn:180401:p:10-20 is not listed on IDEAS
    11. repec:ces:ifodic:v:16:y:2018:i:3:p:50000000003753 is not listed on IDEAS

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Fiscal policy; Fiscal rules; Fiscal deficits; Debt reduction; Governance; deficit bias; fiscal governance; Structure and Scope of Government; Deficit;

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:imf:imfsdn:18/04. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Jim Beardow) or (Hassan Zaidi) The email address of this maintainer does not seem to be valid anymore. Please ask Hassan Zaidi to update the entry or send us the correct email address. General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/imfffus.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.