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Liquidity and Counterparty Risks Tradeoff in Money Market Networks

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Abstract

We examine how liquidity is exchanged in different types of Colombian money market networks (i.e. secured, unsecured, and central bank’s repo networks). Our examination first measures and analyzes the centralization of money market networks. Afterwards, based on a simple network optimization problem between financial institutions’ mutual distances and number of connections, we examine the tradeoff between liquidity risk and counterparty risk. Empirical evidence suggests that different types of money market networks diverge in their centralization, and in how they balance counterparty risk and liquidity risk. We confirm an inverse and significant relation between counterparty risk and liquidity risk, which differs across markets in an intuitive manner. We find evidence of liquidity cross-underinsurance in secured and unsecured money markets, but they differ in their nature. Central bank’s role in mitigating liquidity risk is also supported by our results.

Suggested Citation

  • Carlos León & Miguel Sarmiento, 2016. "Liquidity and Counterparty Risks Tradeoff in Money Market Networks," Borradores de Economia 936, Banco de la Republica de Colombia.
  • Handle: RePEc:bdr:borrec:936
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    1. repec:lde:journl:y:2018:i:88:p:109-153 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. repec:taf:jitecd:v:28:y:2019:i:4:p:452-485 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Freddy Cepeda-López & Fredy Gamboa-Estrada & Carlos León & Hernán Rincón-Castro, 2019. "The evolution of world trade from 1995 to 2014: A network approach," The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 28(4), pages 452-485, May.
    4. Miguel Sarmiento, 2019. "The Impact of Exogenous Liquidity Shocks on Banks Funding Costs: Microevidence from the Unsecured Interbank Market," IHEID Working Papers 01-2019, Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies.
    5. repec:col:000174:016024 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. Fabio Ortega & Carlos León, 2017. "Las transferencias compensadas por ACH Colombia: Un análisis desde la perspectiva de topología de redes," Borradores de Economia 990, Banco de la Republica de Colombia.
    7. Miguel Sarmiento, 2016. "Market Discipline and Liquidity Risk: Evidence from the Interbank Funds Market," IHEID Working Papers 14-2016, Economics Section, The Graduate Institute of International Studies.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    liquidity risk; counterparty risk; network; centralization; money market;

    JEL classification:

    • D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation

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