IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ajk/ajkdps/024.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Psychological pressure and the right to determine the moves in dynamic tournaments – Evidence from a natural field experiment

Author

Listed:
  • Mark Kassis

    () (Center for Sports and Management (CSM), WHU Otto Beisheim School of Management, Erkrather Str. 224a, 40233, Düsseldorf, Germany)

  • Sascha L. Schmidt

    () (Center for Sports and Management (CSM), WHU Otto Beisheim School of Management, Erkrather Str. 224a, 40233, Düsseldorf, Germany)

  • Dominik Schreyer

    () (Center for Sports and Management (CSM), WHU Otto Beisheim School of Management, Erkrather Str. 224a, 40233, Düsseldorf, Germany)

  • Matthias Sutter

    () (Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods, Kurt-Schumacher-Straße 10, 53113 Bonn, Germany; University of Cologne and University of Innsbruck)

Abstract

In this paper, we show that the right to determine the sequence of moves in a dynamic team tournament improves the chances of winning the contest. Because studying dynamic team tournaments – like R&D races – with interim feedback is difficult with company data, we examine decisions of highly paid professionals in soccer penalty shootouts and show that teams whose captains can decide about the shooting sequence are more likely to win the shootout. So, managerial decisions matter for outcomes of dynamic tournaments and we discuss potential reasons for this finding.

Suggested Citation

  • Mark Kassis & Sascha L. Schmidt & Dominik Schreyer & Matthias Sutter, 2020. "Psychological pressure and the right to determine the moves in dynamic tournaments – Evidence from a natural field experiment," ECONtribute Discussion Papers Series 024, University of Bonn and University of Cologne, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:ajk:ajkdps:024
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://selten.institute/RePEc/ajk/ajkdps/ECONtribute_024_2020.pdf
    File Function: First version, 2020
    Download Restriction: no

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Feri, Francesco & Innocenti, Alessandro & Pin, Paolo, 2013. "Is there psychological pressure in competitive environments?," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 39(C), pages 249-256.
    2. Walker, Mark & Wooders, John & Amir, Rabah, 2011. "Equilibrium play in matches: Binary Markov games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 487-502, March.
    3. Arrondel, Luc & Duhautois, Richard & Laslier, Jean-François, 2019. "Decision under psychological pressure: The shooter's anxiety at the penalty kick," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 70(C), pages 22-35.
    4. Konrad, Kai A., 2009. "Strategy and Dynamics in Contests," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199549603.
    5. Jose Apesteguia & Ignacio Palacios-Huerta, 2010. "Psychological Pressure in Competitive Environments: Evidence from a Randomized Natural Experiment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(5), pages 2548-2564, December.
    6. V. Bhaskar, 2009. "Rational Adversaries? Evidence from Randomised Trials in One Day Cricket," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(534), pages 1-23, January.
    7. Dohmen, Thomas J., 2008. "Do professionals choke under pressure?," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 65(3-4), pages 636-653, March.
    8. González-Díaz, Julio & Palacios-Huerta, Ignacio, 2016. "Cognitive performance in competitive environments: Evidence from a natural experiment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 139(C), pages 40-52.
    9. Martin G. Kocher & Marc V. Lenz & Matthias Sutter, 2012. "Psychological Pressure in Competitive Environments: New Evidence from Randomized Natural Experiments," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 58(8), pages 1585-1591, August.
    10. P.-A. Chiappori, 2002. "Testing Mixed-Strategy Equilibria When Players Are Heterogeneous: The Case of Penalty Kicks in Soccer," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 1138-1151, September.
    11. Richard L. Fullerton & R. Preston McAfee, 1999. "Auctioning Entry into Tournaments," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(3), pages 573-605, June.
    12. Gueorgui I. Kolev & Gonçalo Pina & Federico Todeschini, 2015. "Decision Making and Underperformance in Competitive Environments: Evidence from the National Hockey League," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 68(1), pages 65-80, February.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Dynamic tournament; sports professionals; psychological pressure; value of decision rights; penalty shoot-outs; behavioral economics;

    JEL classification:

    • C93 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Field Experiments
    • D00 - Microeconomics - - General - - - General
    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
    • D91 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Role and Effects of Psychological, Emotional, Social, and Cognitive Factors on Decision Making
    • Z20 - Other Special Topics - - Sports Economics - - - General

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ajk:ajkdps:024. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (ECONtribute Office). General contact details of provider: https://selten.institute .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.