Decision Under Psychological Pressure: The Shooter's Anxiety at the Penalty Kick
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References listed on IDEAS
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NEP fieldsThis paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2018-05-14 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2018-05-14 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-SPO-2018-05-14 (Sports & Economics)
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