Contracting for Groundwater Irrigation:A Principal-Agent Based Approach to Determining Contract Effectiveness
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- Abhijit Banerji & Gauri Khanna & J. V. Meenakshi, 2010.
"Social Contracts, Markets And Efficiency -- Groundwater Irrigation In North India,"
183, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
- Banerji, A. & Meenakshi, J.V. & Khanna, Gauri, 2012. "Social contracts, markets and efficiency: Groundwater irrigation in North India," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 98(2), pages 228-237.
- Spielman, David J. & Pandya-Lorch, Rajul, 2009. "Millions fed: Proven successes in agricultural development," IFPRI books, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), number Millions Fed Book: 2009, May.
- Kajisa, Kei & Sakurai, Takeshi, 2005. "Efficiency and equity in groundwater markets: the case of Madhya Pradesh, India," Environment and Development Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 10(06), pages 801-819, December.
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