Social contracts, markets and efficiency: Groundwater irrigation in North India
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- Abhijit Banerji & Gauri Khanna & J. V. Meenakshi, 2010. "Social Contracts, Markets And Efficiency -- Groundwater Irrigation In North India," Working papers 183, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
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CitationsCitations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Watto, Muhammad, 2013. "Measuring Groundwater Irrigation Efficiency in Pakistan: A DEA Approach Using the Sub-vector and Slack-based Models," 2013 Conference (57th), February 5-8, 2013, Sydney, Australia 152204, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society.
- Siwa Msangi & Sarah Ann Cline, 2016. "Improving Groundwater Management for Indian Agriculture: Assessing Tradeoffs Across Policy Instruments," Water Economics and Policy (WEP), World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., vol. 2(03), pages 1-33, September.
- Gine,Xavier & Jacoby,Hanan G. & Gine,Xavier & Jacoby,Hanan G., 2016. "Markets, contracts, and uncertainty in a groundwater economy," Policy Research Working Paper Series 7694, The World Bank.
- Michler, Jeffrey D. & Wu, Steven, 2013. "Contracting for Groundwater Irrigation:A Principal-Agent Based Approach to Determining Contract Effectiveness," 2013 Annual Meeting, August 4-6, 2013, Washington, D.C. 149437, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
- Michler, Jeffrey D. & Balagtas, Joseph Valdes, 2013. "The Determinants of Rice Storage: Evidence from Rice Farmers in Bangladesh," 2013 Annual Meeting, August 4-6, 2013, Washington, D.C. 150267, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
- Ram RANJAN, 2014. "Groundwater Management Through Collective Participation: Why Some Institutions Succeed And Others Fail?," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 85(3), pages 427-452, September.
- Watto, Muhammad Arif & Mugera, Amin William, 2013. "Measuring Groundwater Irrigation Efficiency in Pakistan: A DEA Approach Using the Sub-vector and Slack-based Models," Working Papers 144943, University of Western Australia, School of Agricultural and Resource Economics.
- Ram Fishman & Upmanu Lall & Vijay Modi & Nikunj Parekh, 2016. "Can Electricity Pricing Save India’s Groundwater? Field Evidence from a Novel Policy Mechanism in Gujarat," Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, University of Chicago Press, vol. 3(4), pages 819-855.
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More about this item
KeywordsWater markets; Market structure; Social contracts; Water pricing;
- L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
- Q1 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture
- Q2 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation
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