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Social Contracts, Markets And Efficiency -- Groundwater Irrigation In North India

Author

Listed:
  • Abhijit Banerji

    (Department of Economics, Delhi School of Economics, Delhi, India)

  • Gauri Khanna

    (World Health Organization, Geneva)

  • J. V. Meenakshi

    (Department of Economics, Delhi School of Economics, Delhi, India)

Abstract

This paper uses primary data to analyze the institutions and informal markets that govern groundwater allocation in the principal sugarcane belt of North India. In contrast to earlier literature, we find that the observed water trades result in efficient water allocation across farms. We interpret this and other stylized facts in terms of a simple bargaining model with limited inter-player transfers. Poor functioning of the power sector leads to reduced pumping and a water supply constraint. Simulations show that power supply reform can significantly increase farm yields, be financed out of the increased farm profits, and provide an instrument to use for attaining intertemporal efficiency in water allocation.

Suggested Citation

  • Abhijit Banerji & Gauri Khanna & J. V. Meenakshi, 2010. "Social Contracts, Markets And Efficiency -- Groundwater Irrigation In North India," Working papers 183, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:cde:cdewps:183
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    2. Srivastava, S.K. & Kumar, Ranjit & Singh, R.P., 2009. "Extent of Groundwater Extraction and Irrigation Efficiency on Farms under Different Water-market Regimes in Central Uttar Pradesh," Agricultural Economics Research Review, Agricultural Economics Research Association (India), vol. 22(01), January.
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    Keywords

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    JEL classification:

    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
    • Q1 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Agriculture
    • Q2 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation

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