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Bo Chen

Personal Details

First Name:Bo
Middle Name:
Last Name:Chen
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pch458
http://faculty.smu.edu/bochen
Department of Economics Southern Methodist University 3300 Dyer Street Suite 301, Umphrey Lee Center Dallas TX 75275-0496
1-214-768-2715

Affiliation

Department of Economics
Southern Methodist University

Dallas, Texas (United States)
http://www.smu.edu/economics/

: (214) 768-3577
(214) 768-1821
P.O. Box 750496, Dallas, TX 75275-0496
RePEc:edi:desmuus (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

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Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Bo Chen & Satoru Fujishige & Zaifu Yang, 2010. "Decentralized Market Processes to Stable Job Matchings with Competitive Salaries," KIER Working Papers 749, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.

Articles

  1. Bo Chen & Satoru Fujishige, 2013. "On the feasible payoff set of two-player repeated games with unequal discounting," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(1), pages 295-303, February.
  2. Chen, Bo & Takahashi, Satoru, 2012. "A folk theorem for repeated games with unequal discounting," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 571-581.
  3. Chen, Bo, 2012. "All-or-nothing payments," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 133-142.
  4. Chen, Bo, 2010. "A belief-based approach to the repeated prisoners' dilemma with asymmetric private monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(1), pages 402-420, January.
  5. Bo Chen, 2010. "All-or-Nothing Monitoring: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(1), pages 625-627, March.
  6. Chen, Bo & Potipiti, Tanapong, 2010. "Optimal selling mechanisms with countervailing positive externalities and an application to tradable retaliation in the WTO," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(5), pages 825-843, September.
  7. Chen, Bo, 2008. "On effective minimax payoffs and unequal discounting," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 105-107, July.
  8. Chen, Bo, 2007. "The Pareto frontier of a finitely repeated game with unequal discounting," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 94(2), pages 177-184, February.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Bo Chen & Satoru Fujishige & Zaifu Yang, 2010. "Decentralized Market Processes to Stable Job Matchings with Competitive Salaries," KIER Working Papers 749, Kyoto University, Institute of Economic Research.

    Cited by:

    1. Newton, Jonathan & Sawa, Ryoji, 2015. "A one-shot deviation principle for stability in matching problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 1-27.
    2. Peter Biro & Gethin Norman, 2011. "Analysis of Stochastic Matching Markets," IEHAS Discussion Papers 1132, Institute of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
    3. Heinrich Nax & Bary Pradelski, 2015. "Evolutionary dynamics and equitable core selection in assignment games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(4), pages 903-932, November.
    4. Chen, Bo & Fujishige, Satoru & Yang, Zaifu, 2016. "Random decentralized market processes for stable job matchings with competitive salaries," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 165(C), pages 25-36.
    5. Klaus, Bettina & Newton, Jonathan, 2014. "Stochastic Stability in Assignment Problems," Working Papers 2014-05, University of Sydney, School of Economics.
    6. Nax, Heinrich H. & Pradelski, Bary S. R., 2015. "Evolutionary dynamics and equitable core selection in assignment games," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 65428, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    7. Bettina Klaus & Frédéric Payot, 2013. "Paths to Stability in the Assignment Problem," Cahiers de Recherches Economiques du Département d'Econométrie et d'Economie politique (DEEP) 13.14, Université de Lausanne, Faculté des HEC, DEEP.
    8. Bary S.R. Pradelski, 2014. "Evolutionary Dynamics and Fast Convergence in the Assignment Game," Economics Series Working Papers 700, University of Oxford, Department of Economics.
    9. Emiliya Lazarova & Dinko Dimitrov, 2013. "Paths to Stability in Two-sided Matching with Uncertainty," Working Papers 2013.02, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
    10. Bolle Friedel & Otto Philipp E., 2016. "Matching as a Stochastic Process," Journal of Economics and Statistics (Jahrbuecher fuer Nationaloekonomie und Statistik), De Gruyter, vol. 236(3), pages 323-348, May.
    11. Satoru Fujishige & Zaifu Yang, 2015. "Decentralised Random Competitive Dynamic Market Processes," Discussion Papers 15/27, Department of Economics, University of York.
    12. Heinrich H. Nax & Bary S. R. Pradelski, 2016. "Core Stability and Core Selection in a Decentralized Labor Matching Market," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 7(2), pages 1-16, March.

Articles

  1. Chen, Bo & Takahashi, Satoru, 2012. "A folk theorem for repeated games with unequal discounting," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 571-581.

    Cited by:

    1. Carmona, Guilherme & Carvalho, Luís, 2016. "Repeated two-person zero-sum games with unequal discounting and private monitoring," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 131-138.
    2. Kimmo Berg, 2017. "Extremal Pure Strategies and Monotonicity in Repeated Games," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 49(3), pages 387-404, March.
    3. Mitri Kitti, 2014. "Equilibrium Payoffs for Pure Strategies in Repeated Games," Discussion Papers 98, Aboa Centre for Economics.
    4. Sugaya, Takuo, 2015. "Characterizing the limit set of PPE payoffs with unequal discounting," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(3), September.

  2. Chen, Bo, 2012. "All-or-nothing payments," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 133-142.

    Cited by:

    1. Balmaceda, Felipe, 2016. "Optimal task assignments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 1-18.
    2. Gregory Phelan, 2017. "Correlated Default and Financial Intermediation," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 72(3), pages 1253-1284, June.
    3. Carli, Francesco & Uras, Burak R., 2017. "Joint-liability with endogenously asymmetric group loan contracts," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, pages 72-90.
    4. Rui R. Zhao, 2008. "All-or-Nothing Monitoring," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(4), pages 1619-1628, September.
    5. Bo Chen & Yu Chen & David Rietzke, 2017. "Simple Contracts under Observable and Hidden Actions," Graz Economics Papers 2017-07, University of Graz, Department of Economics.
    6. David Michael Rietzke & Yu Chen, 2016. "Push or pull? Performance pay, incentives, and information," Working Papers 127987900, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.

  3. Chen, Bo, 2010. "A belief-based approach to the repeated prisoners' dilemma with asymmetric private monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 145(1), pages 402-420, January.

    Cited by:

    1. Yuichi Yamamoto, 2012. "Individual Learning and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 12-044, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
    2. Yuichi Yamamoto, 2013. "Individual Learning and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated Games," PIER Working Paper Archive 13-038, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.

  4. Bo Chen, 2010. "All-or-Nothing Monitoring: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 100(1), pages 625-627, March.

    Cited by:

    1. Chen, Bo, 2012. "All-or-nothing payments," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(3), pages 133-142.
    2. Dunia López-Pintado & Juan D. Moreno-Ternero, 2011. "On the optimal management of teams under budget constraints," Working Papers 11.11, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics.
    3. Bo Chen & Yu Chen & David Rietzke, 2017. "Simple Contracts under Observable and Hidden Actions," Graz Economics Papers 2017-07, University of Graz, Department of Economics.
    4. David Michael Rietzke & Yu Chen, 2016. "Push or pull? Performance pay, incentives, and information," Working Papers 127987900, Lancaster University Management School, Economics Department.

  5. Chen, Bo & Potipiti, Tanapong, 2010. "Optimal selling mechanisms with countervailing positive externalities and an application to tradable retaliation in the WTO," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 46(5), pages 825-843, September.

    Cited by:

    1. Bhirombhakdi, Kornpob & Potipiti, Tanapong, 2012. "Practically Implementable Auction for a Good with Countervailing Positive Externalities," MPRA Paper 42911, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Bagwell, Kyle & Bown, Chad P. & Staiger, Robert, 2015. "Is the WTO Passé?," CEPR Discussion Papers 10672, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    3. Brocas, Isabelle, 2014. "Countervailing incentives in allocation mechanisms with type-dependent externalities," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 22-33.
    4. Isabelle Brocas, 2013. "Optimal allocation mechanisms with type-dependent negative externalities," Theory and Decision, Springer, pages 359-387.
    5. Hummel, Patrick, 2016. "Position auctions with dynamic resizing," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 38-46.

  6. Chen, Bo, 2008. "On effective minimax payoffs and unequal discounting," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 105-107, July.

    Cited by:

    1. Carmona, Guilherme & Carvalho, Luís, 2016. "Repeated two-person zero-sum games with unequal discounting and private monitoring," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 131-138.
    2. Herings, P. Jean-Jacques & Meshalkin, Andrey & Predtetchinski, Arkadi, 2017. "A one-period memory folk theorem for multilateral bargaining games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 103(C), pages 185-198.
    3. Herings P.J.J. & Meshalkin A. & Predtetchinski A., 2012. "A Folk Theorem for Bargaining Games," Research Memorandum 056, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    4. Daniel Cardona & Antoni Rubí-Barceló, 2016. "Time-Preference Heterogeneity and Multiplicity of Equilibria in Two-Group Bargaining," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 7(2), pages 1-17, May.
    5. Guéron, Yves & Lamadon, Thibaut & Thomas, Caroline D., 2011. "On the folk theorem with one-dimensional payoffs and different discount factors," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 287-295, September.
    6. Sugaya, Takuo, 2015. "Characterizing the limit set of PPE payoffs with unequal discounting," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 10(3), September.
    7. Chen, Bo & Takahashi, Satoru, 2012. "A folk theorem for repeated games with unequal discounting," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 571-581.

  7. Chen, Bo, 2007. "The Pareto frontier of a finitely repeated game with unequal discounting," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 94(2), pages 177-184, February.

    Cited by:

    1. Carmona, Guilherme & Carvalho, Luís, 2016. "Repeated two-person zero-sum games with unequal discounting and private monitoring," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 131-138.
    2. Bo Chen & Satoru Fujishige, 2013. "On the feasible payoff set of two-player repeated games with unequal discounting," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(1), pages 295-303, February.

More information

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Statistics

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Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 2 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-LAB: Labour Economics (2) 2011-01-03 2011-01-23

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