Characterizing the feasible payoff set of OLG repeated games
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DOI: 10.1016/j.jmateco.2024.103082
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More about this item
Keywords
Overlapping generation; Repeated games;JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
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