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Ziv Hellman

Personal Details

First Name:Ziv
Middle Name:
Last Name:Hellman
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:phe197
https://sites.google.com/site/drzivhellman/

Affiliation

Department of Economics
Bar Ilan University

Ramat-Gan, Israel
http://www.biu.ac.il/SOC/ec/

: Phone: +972-3-5318345
+972-3-7384034
Faculty of Social Sciences, Bar Ilan University 52900 Ramat-Gan
RePEc:edi:debaril (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Hellman, Ziv & Peretz, Ron, 2013. "Graph value for cooperative games," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 50073, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
  2. Ziv Hellman & Yehuda (John) Levy, 2013. "Bayesian Games With a Continuum of States," Discussion Paper Series dp641, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
  3. Ziv Hellman, 2012. "Countable Spaces and Common Priors," Discussion Paper Series dp604, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
  4. Ziv Hellman, 2012. "Deludedly Agreeing to Agree," Discussion Paper Series dp605, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
  5. Ziv Hellman, 2012. "A Game with No Bayesian Approximate Equilibria," Discussion Paper Series dp615, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
  6. Mikel Alvarez-Mozos & Ziv Hellman & Eyal Winter, 2012. "Spectrum Value for Coalitional Games," Discussion Paper Series dp618, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
  7. Ziv Hellman & Dov Samet, 2010. "How Common Are Common Priors?," Discussion Paper Series dp532, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
  8. Ziv Hellman, 2010. "Almost Common Priors," Discussion Paper Series dp560, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
  9. Ziv Hellman, 2009. "Bargaining Set Solution Concepts in Repeated Cooperative Games," Discussion Paper Series dp523, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
  10. Hellman, Ziv, 2008. "Bargaining Set Solution Concepts in Dynamic Cooperative Games," MPRA Paper 8798, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  11. Hellman, Ziv, 2007. "Iterated Expectations, Compact Spaces and Common Priors," MPRA Paper 3794, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  12. Hellman, Ziv, 2007. "Common Knowledge and Disparate Priors: When it is O.K. to Agree to Disagree," MPRA Paper 3404, University Library of Munich, Germany.

Articles

  1. Ziv Hellman, 2014. "Countable spaces and common priors," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 43(1), pages 193-213, February.
  2. Hellman, Ziv, 2013. "Weakly rational expectations," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(6), pages 496-500.
  3. Álvarez-Mozos, Mikel & Hellman, Ziv & Winter, Eyal, 2013. "Spectrum value for coalitional games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 132-142.
  4. Ziv Hellman, 2013. "Almost common priors," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(2), pages 399-410, May.
  5. Hellman, Ziv & Samet, Dov, 2012. "How common are common priors?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 517-525.
  6. Hellman, Ziv, 2011. "Iterated expectations, compact spaces, and common priors," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 163-171, May.

Citations

Many of the citations below have been collected in an experimental project, CitEc, where a more detailed citation analysis can be found. These are citations from works listed in RePEc that could be analyzed mechanically. So far, only a minority of all works could be analyzed. See under "Corrections" how you can help improve the citation analysis.

Working papers

  1. Hellman, Ziv & Peretz, Ron, 2013. "Graph value for cooperative games," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 50073, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.

    Cited by:

    1. Mikel Alvarez-Mozos & Ziv Hellman & Eyal Winter, 2012. "Spectrum Value for Coalitional Games," Discussion Paper Series dp618, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.

  2. Ziv Hellman & Yehuda (John) Levy, 2013. "Bayesian Games With a Continuum of States," Discussion Paper Series dp641, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.

    Cited by:

    1. Hellman, Ziv, 2014. "A game with no Bayesian approximate equilibria," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 153(C), pages 138-151.
    2. Bajoori, Elnaz & Flesch, János & Vermeulen, Dries, 2016. "Behavioral perfect equilibrium in Bayesian games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 98(C), pages 78-109.

  3. Ziv Hellman, 2012. "A Game with No Bayesian Approximate Equilibria," Discussion Paper Series dp615, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.

    Cited by:

    1. Dirk Bergemann & Stephen Morris & Satoru Takahashi, 2010. "Interdependent Preferences and Strategic Distinguishability," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1772, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    2. Hellman, Ziv & Levy, Yehuda, 2017. "Bayesian games with a continuum of states," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 12(3), September.

  4. Mikel Alvarez-Mozos & Ziv Hellman & Eyal Winter, 2012. "Spectrum Value for Coalitional Games," Discussion Paper Series dp618, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.

    Cited by:

    1. Hellman, Ziv & Peretz, Ron, 2013. "Graph value for cooperative games," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 50073, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    2. Tobias Hiller, 2018. "The Effects of Excluding Coalitions," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 9(1), pages 1-7, January.
    3. Emilio Calvo & Esther Gutiérrez-López, 2015. "The value in games with restricted cooperation," Discussion Papers in Economic Behaviour 0115, University of Valencia, ERI-CES.
    4. Ziv Hellman & Ron Peretz, 2015. "Values for Cooperative Games over Graphs and Games With Inadmissible Coalitions," Working Papers 2015-04, Bar-Ilan University, Department of Economics.

  5. Ziv Hellman & Dov Samet, 2010. "How Common Are Common Priors?," Discussion Paper Series dp532, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.

    Cited by:

    1. Hellwig, Martin F., 2013. "From posteriors to priors via cycles: An addendum," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 118(3), pages 455-458.
    2. Collevecchio, Andrea & LiCalzi, Marco, 2012. "The probability of nontrivial common knowledge," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 556-570.
    3. Guilhem Lecouteux, 2017. "Bayesian Game Theorists and Non-Bayesian Players," GREDEG Working Papers 2017-30, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), University of Nice Sophia Antipolis.
    4. Ziv Hellman, 2012. "Countable Spaces and Common Priors," Discussion Paper Series dp604, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    5. Guilhem Lecouteux, 2017. "Bayesian Game Theorists and non-Bayesian Players," Working Papers halshs-01633126, HAL.
    6. Jose Alvaro Rodrigues-Neto, 2011. "The Cycles Approach," ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics 2011-547, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics.
    7. Ziv Hellman, 2010. "Almost Common Priors," Discussion Paper Series dp560, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    8. Halpern, Joseph Y. & Kets, Willemien, 2015. "Ambiguous language and common priors," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 171-180.
    9. Martin Hellwig, 2011. "Incomplete-Information Models of Large Economies with Anonymity: Existence and Uniqueness of Common Priors," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2011_08, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    10. Yaw Nyarko, 2010. "Most games violate the common priors doctrine," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 6(1), pages 189-194.
    11. Hellman, Ziv, 2013. "Weakly rational expectations," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(6), pages 496-500.

  6. Ziv Hellman, 2010. "Almost Common Priors," Discussion Paper Series dp560, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.

    Cited by:

    1. Bach, Christian W. & Perea, Andrés, 2013. "Agreeing to disagree with lexicographic prior beliefs," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 129-133.

  7. Hellman, Ziv, 2008. "Bargaining Set Solution Concepts in Dynamic Cooperative Games," MPRA Paper 8798, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    Cited by:

    1. Ehud Lehrer & Marco Scarsini, 2013. "On the Core of Dynamic Cooperative Games," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 3(3), pages 359-373, September.

  8. Hellman, Ziv, 2007. "Iterated Expectations, Compact Spaces and Common Priors," MPRA Paper 3794, University Library of Munich, Germany.

    Cited by:

    1. Ziv Hellman, 2012. "Countable Spaces and Common Priors," Discussion Paper Series dp604, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    2. Lehrer, Ehud & Samet, Dov, 2014. "Belief consistency and trade consistency," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 83(C), pages 165-177.

Articles

  1. Álvarez-Mozos, Mikel & Hellman, Ziv & Winter, Eyal, 2013. "Spectrum value for coalitional games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 82(C), pages 132-142.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  2. Ziv Hellman, 2013. "Almost common priors," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 42(2), pages 399-410, May.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  3. Hellman, Ziv & Samet, Dov, 2012. "How common are common priors?," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 517-525.
    See citations under working paper version above.
  4. Hellman, Ziv, 2011. "Iterated expectations, compact spaces, and common priors," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 163-171, May.
    See citations under working paper version above.Sorry, no citations of articles recorded.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

Access and download statistics for all items

Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 12 papers announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-GTH: Game Theory (7) 2008-05-24 2009-10-31 2010-02-13 2010-10-30 2012-08-23 2012-09-16 2013-06-16. Author is listed
  2. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (6) 2010-10-30 2012-05-15 2012-05-15 2012-08-23 2012-09-16 2013-06-16. Author is listed
  3. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (1) 2012-09-16
  4. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory & Applications (1) 2013-06-16
  5. NEP-HPE: History & Philosophy of Economics (1) 2012-09-16
  6. NEP-NET: Network Economics (1) 2008-05-24
  7. NEP-SOC: Social Norms & Social Capital (1) 2008-05-24

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