Deludedly Agreeing to Agree
We study conditions relating to the impossibility of agreeing to disagree in models of interactive KD45 belief (in contrast to models of S5 knowledge, which are used in nearly all the agreements literature). Agreement and disagreement are studied under models of belief in three broad settings: non-probabilistic decision models, probabilistic belief revision of priors, and dynamic communication among players. We show that even when the truth axiom is not assumed it turns out that players will find it impossible to agree to disagree under fairly broad conditions.
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"Market Crashes without External Shocks,"
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