IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/huj/dispap/dp605.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Deludedly Agreeing to Agree

Author

Listed:
  • Ziv Hellman

Abstract

We study conditions relating to the impossibility of agreeing to disagree in models of interactive KD45 belief (in contrast to models of S5 knowledge, which are used in nearly all the agreements literature). Agreement and disagreement are studied under models of belief in three broad settings: non-probabilistic decision models, probabilistic belief revision of priors, and dynamic communication among players. We show that even when the truth axiom is not assumed it turns out that players will find it impossible to agree to disagree under fairly broad conditions.

Suggested Citation

  • Ziv Hellman, 2012. "Deludedly Agreeing to Agree," Discussion Paper Series dp605, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
  • Handle: RePEc:huj:dispap:dp605
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://ratio.huji.ac.il/sites/default/files/publications/dp605.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Sergiu Hart & Yair Tauman, 2004. "Market Crashes without External Shocks," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 77(1), pages 1-8, January.
    2. Morris, Stephen, 1996. "The Logic of Belief and Belief Change: A Decision Theoretic Approach," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 1-23, April.
    3. Samet, Dov, 2010. "Agreeing to disagree: The non-probabilistic case," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 169-174, May.
    4. Giacomo Bonanno & Klaus Nehring, 1999. "How to make sense of the common prior assumption under incomplete information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 28(3), pages 409-434.
    5. Jean-Marc Tallon & Jean-Christophe Vergnaud & Shmuel Zamir, 2004. "Communication among agents: a way to revise beliefs in KD45 Kripke structures," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00499348, HAL.
    6. Dov Samet, 2008. "The sure-thing principle and independence of irrelevant knowledge," Levine's Working Paper Archive 122247000000002297, David K. Levine.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:huj:dispap:dp605. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Michael Simkin). General contact details of provider: http://edirc.repec.org/data/crihuil.html .

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service hosted by the Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis . RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.