Agreeing to disagree: The non-probabilistic case
A non-probabilistic generalization of Aumann's agreement theorem is proved. Early attempts at such a theorem were based on a version of the sure-thing principle which assumes an intrapersonal-interstate comparison of knowledge. But such comparisons are impossible in partition structures. The theorem proved here is based on a new version of the sure-thing principle that makes an interpersonal-intrastate comparison of knowledge.
References listed on IDEAS
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- Robert J. Aumann, 1999. "Interactive epistemology II: Probability," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 28(3), pages 301-314.
- Giacomo Bonanno & Klaus Nehring, "undated".
"Agreeing To Disagree: A Survey,"
Department of Economics
97-18, California Davis - Department of Economics.
- Klaus Nehring & Giacomo Bonanno, 2003. "Agreeing To Disagree: A Survey," Working Papers 9718, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
- Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu Hart & Motty Perry, 2005. "Conditioning and the Sure-Thing Principle," Discussion Paper Series dp393, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu Hart & Motty Perry, 2005. "Conditioning and the Sure-Thing Principle," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000193, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Robert J. Aumann, 1999. "Interactive epistemology I: Knowledge," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 28(3), pages 263-300.
- Cave, Jonathan A. K., 1983. "Learning to agree," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 147-152.
- Bacharach, Michael, 1985. "Some extensions of a claim of Aumann in an axiomatic model of knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 167-190, October.
- Klaus Nehring, 2003. "Common Priors For Like-Minded Agents," Economics Working Papers 0035, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
- Robert J Aumann, 1999. "Agreeing to Disagree," Levine's Working Paper Archive 512, David K. Levine. Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)
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