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Agreeing to disagree: The non-probabilistic case

  • Samet, Dov

A non-probabilistic generalization of Aumann's agreement theorem is proved. Early attempts at such a theorem were based on a version of the sure-thing principle which assumes an intrapersonal-interstate comparison of knowledge. But such comparisons are impossible in partition structures. The theorem proved here is based on a new version of the sure-thing principle that makes an interpersonal-intrastate comparison of knowledge.

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6WFW-4TMBVPX-3/2/2e16cb6f409b94e04b294d3d2f7d5abb
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Games and Economic Behavior.

Volume (Year): 69 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 (May)
Pages: 169-174

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Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:69:y:2010:i:1:p:169-174
Contact details of provider: Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622836

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  1. Bacharach, Michael, 1985. "Some extensions of a claim of Aumann in an axiomatic model of knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 167-190, October.
  2. Klaus Nehring & Giacomo Bonanno, 2003. "Agreeing To Disagree: A Survey," Working Papers 9718, University of California, Davis, Department of Economics.
  3. Robert J Aumann, 1999. "Agreeing to Disagree," Levine's Working Paper Archive 512, David K. Levine.
  4. Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu Hart & Motty Perry, 2005. "Conditioning and the Sure-Thing Principle," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000193, UCLA Department of Economics.
  5. Robert J. Aumann, 1999. "Interactive epistemology I: Knowledge," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 28(3), pages 263-300.
  6. Robert J. Aumann, 1999. "Interactive epistemology II: Probability," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 28(3), pages 301-314.
  7. Klaus Nehring, 2003. "Common Priors For Like-Minded Agents," Economics Working Papers 0035, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
  8. Cave, Jonathan A. K., 1983. "Learning to agree," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 147-152.
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