Agreeing to disagree: The non-probabilistic case
A non-probabilistic generalization of Aumann's agreement theorem is proved. Early attempts at such a theorem were based on a version of the sure-thing principle which assumes an intrapersonal-interstate comparison of knowledge. But such comparisons are impossible in partition structures. The theorem proved here is based on a new version of the sure-thing principle that makes an interpersonal-intrastate comparison of knowledge.
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- Giacomo Bonanno & Klaus Nehring, .
"Agreeing To Disagree: A Survey,"
Department of Economics
97-18, California Davis - Department of Economics.
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"Conditioning and the Sure-Thing Principle,"
Discussion Paper Series
dp393, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- Robert J Aumann, 1999. "Agreeing to Disagree," Levine's Working Paper Archive 512, David K. Levine.
- Klaus Nehring, 2003. "Common Priors For Like-Minded Agents," Economics Working Papers 0035, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
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