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Agreeing to disagree: The non-probabilistic case

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  • Samet, Dov

Abstract

A non-probabilistic generalization of Aumann's agreement theorem is proved. Early attempts at such a theorem were based on a version of the sure-thing principle which assumes an intrapersonal-interstate comparison of knowledge. But such comparisons are impossible in partition structures. The theorem proved here is based on a new version of the sure-thing principle that makes an interpersonal-intrastate comparison of knowledge.

Suggested Citation

  • Samet, Dov, 2010. "Agreeing to disagree: The non-probabilistic case," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 169-174, May.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:gamebe:v:69:y:2010:i:1:p:169-174
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Bacharach, Michael, 1985. "Some extensions of a claim of Aumann in an axiomatic model of knowledge," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 167-190, October.
    2. Giacomo Bonanno & Klaus Nehring, "undated". "Agreeing To Disagree: A Survey," Department of Economics 97-18, California Davis - Department of Economics.
    3. Robert J. Aumann, 1999. "Interactive epistemology II: Probability," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 28(3), pages 301-314.
    4. Robert J. Aumann & Sergiu Hart & Motty Perry, 2005. "Conditioning and the Sure-Thing Principle," Discussion Paper Series dp393, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    5. Klaus Nehring, 2003. "Common Priors For Like-Minded Agents," Economics Working Papers 0035, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science.
    6. Robert J Aumann, 1999. "Agreeing to Disagree," Levine's Working Paper Archive 512, David K. Levine.
    7. Robert J. Aumann, 1999. "Interactive epistemology I: Knowledge," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 28(3), pages 263-300.
    8. Cave, Jonathan A. K., 1983. "Learning to agree," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 12(2), pages 147-152.
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    Cited by:

    1. Johan Van Benthem & Eric Pacuit & Olivier Roy, 2011. "Toward a Theory of Play: A Logical Perspective on Games and Interaction," Games, MDPI, Open Access Journal, vol. 2(1), pages 1-35, February.
    2. Tarbush, Bassel, 2016. "Counterfactuals in “agreeing to disagree” type results," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 84(C), pages 125-133.
    3. Ziv Hellman, 2012. "Deludedly Agreeing to Agree," Discussion Paper Series dp605, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
    4. Tarbush, Bassel, 2011. "Generalisation of Samet's (2010) agreement theorem," MPRA Paper 29067, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Tarbush, Bassel, 2011. "Agreeing to disagree with generalised decision functions," MPRA Paper 29066, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Dominiak, Adam & Lefort, Jean-Philippe, 2015. "“Agreeing to disagree” type results under ambiguity," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(C), pages 119-129.
    7. repec:dau:papers:123456789/8575 is not listed on IDEAS
    8. Tsakas, Elias & Voorneveld, Mark, 2007. "Efficient communication, common knowledge, and consensus," Working Papers in Economics 255, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.

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