Report NEP-GTH-2009-10-31This is the archive for NEP-GTH, a report on new working papers in the area of Game Theory. Laszlo A. Koczy issued this report. It is usually issued weekly.
The following items were announced in this report:
- Ziv Hellman, 2009. "Bargaining Set Solution Concepts in Repeated Cooperative Games," Discussion Paper Series dp523, The Federmann Center for the Study of Rationality, the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.
- Item repec:hal:cesptp:halshs-00423922_v2 is not listed on IDEAS anymore
- Item repec:dgr:umamet:2009044 is not listed on IDEAS anymore
- Item repec:hal:cesptp:halshs-00426402_v1 is not listed on IDEAS anymore
- Rabia Nessah & Guoqiang Tian, 2009. "On the Existence of Strong Nash Equilibria," Working Papers 2009-ECO-06, IESEG School of Management.
- Rabia Nessah & Guoqiang Tian, 2008. "The Existence of Equilibria in Discontinuous and Nonconvex Games," Working Papers 2008-ECO-14, IESEG School of Management, revised Mar 2010.
- Grip Andries de & Smits Wendy, 2009. "What affects lifelong learning of scientists and engineers?," Research Memorandum 047, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
- Maroš Servátka & Radovan Vadovic, 2009. "Unequal Outside Options in the Lost Wallet Game," Working Papers in Economics 09/14, University of Canterbury, Department of Economics and Finance.
- Martin Shubik, 2009. "El Farol Revisited: A Note on Emergence, Game Theory and Society," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1733, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
- Item repec:pra:mprapa:18216 is not listed on IDEAS anymore
- Kocher, Martin & Martinsson, Peter & Visser, Martine, 2009. "Social Background, Cooperative Behavior, and Norm Enforcement," Working Papers in Economics 385, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
- Sébastien ROUILLON (GREThA UMR CNRS 5113), 2009. "A new mechanism to implement the Lindahl equilibriums (In French)," Cahiers du GREThA 2009-09, Groupe de Recherche en Economie Théorique et Appliquée.