A new mechanism to implement the Lindahl equilibriums (In French)
This paper presents a new economic mechanism, such that the associated game form implements Lindahl equilibria as Nash equilibria. Each player sends a 2-dimensional message, in order to tell his marginal propensity to pay and his demand for the public good. At a Nash equilibrium, the players directly and honestly reveal data defining a Lindahl equilibrium and the mechanism implements the corresponding allocation. In a quasi-linear economy, formalizing out-of-equilibrium behaviours of the players as a gradient process, the unique stationary point of this process is a Nash equilibrium of the game and it is shown to be globally stable.
|Date of creation:||2009|
|Date of revision:|
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